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In 1769, King George III issued a Royal Charter incorporating
twelve persons as The Trustees of Dartmouth College with the right of
self-perpetuation. The charter also identified one of the trustees,
Eleazar Wheelock, as the founder and initial president of the
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corporation, with the right by provision in his last will and testament
to appoint his successor in office. The purpose of the grant was to
establish a college in New Hampshire, and this was done in the fall of
1770. Shortly before his death in 1779, Eleazar provided in his will that
his son John, then away fighting in the American Revolution, would be
his successor as president. John accepted the office, and was the
dominant force in the affairs of Dartmouth College until a falling out
with the board of trustees led to his removal from office in 1815. John’s
efforts to regain office led the New Hampshire legislature to amend the
Charter of 1769, authorizing a new board, whose trustees then
reappointed John to the presidency. The old trustees refused to accept
the legitimacy of the new board, and Dartmouth College split into
warring camps, each purporting to be the legitimate corporation, and
each with its own body of students and faculty. The old trustees filed
suit seeking to invalidate the New Hampshire legislation. On February
2, 1819, fifty years after the issuance of the charter, John Marshall read
in open court his famous opinion in the Dartmouth College case,
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, holding that the
New Hampshire legislation violated the Contract Clause of
the Constitution. 1
This Article is the first modern work of corporation law
scholarship fully examining the Dartmouth College case as it was lived
and understood at the time. Earlier scholars, the author of this Article
included, 2 have relied on the case to make doctrinal and theory-of-the
firm arguments about Supreme Court precedents regarding the
constitutional rights of corporations. Moreover, these earlier works
have primarily focused on, and found talismanic meaning, in two
sentences in Marshall’s opinion:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its
very existence. 3

With this prior focus, corporate law scholars typically have
viewed the importance of the Dartmouth College case as early evidence
of what the founders and the jurists in that case might have thought
1.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 665 (1819).
2.
See Charles R. T. O’Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social
and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 67
GEO. L.J. 1347 (1979) (discussing the difficulty in applying familiar constitutional principles to
corporations, and analyzing the underlying conceptual doctrines that have guided the Court in its
previous decisions).
3.
Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
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had they been presented with a question concerning a corporation’s
First Amendment rights. 4 Supreme Court Justices in modern corporate
speech cases have used Marshall’s two sentences similarly. 5
The contribution and focus of this paper is understanding the
Dartmouth College case in a broader historical sense, as an integral part
of two ongoing struggles. The first involved the contest between liberty
and power that characterized the founding of America and its
subsequent evolution from a disparate collection of English colonies and
English colonists hewing to English norms and customs into a separate
nation with a decidedly different, more egalitarian and democratic set
of norms and values. The second, beginning to emerge in full force as
the Dartmouth College controversy proceeded, concerned the onset of
the Industrial Revolution and the competing interests of the
federal government, state legislatures, individual citizens, and
incorporated capital. 6
4.
See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak, An Introduction to CORPORATIONS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 3 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (stating
“Chief Justice John Marshall laid out the basic principle [of limited corporate rights] in the famous
Dartmouth College case . . . ,” and then citing the aforementioned two sentences from the opinion);
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling
Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 880–81 (2016) (citing
the two sentences before stating,
As an originalist matter, therefore, it was impossible for the First Amendment to
generally accord business corporations broad expressive rights because the
understanding at the time was that corporations only had the rights specifically
granted in their charters, and that corporations were not in any way persons like actual
human beings.
5.
See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823–28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Marshall’s two sentences as the analytical framework that the majority should
have used); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 428–29 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (citing Marshall’s two sentences and other sources to establish that the Framers
did not intend to extend First Amendment protections to corporations); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 751–52 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the first of Marshall’s
two sentences to explain why “[u]ntil this litigation, no decision of this Court recognized a forprofit corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law, whether
under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA”).
6.
See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993). The
scholarly effort to understand what the founding generation thought and believed when declaring
independence, when adopting the Articles of Confederation, and when later adopting the
Constitution has been described as “accomplished in the face of almost unimaginable
difficulty . . . represent[ing] an extraordinary effort of rescue, a retrieval of something which in the
course of time had become all but lost.” Id. at 5. Thus, if Alexis de Tocqueville had been dropped
into the American colonies in 1765, as Eleazar Wheelock was seeking a charter for what would
become Dartmouth College, or into the young American nation in 1790, or anytime in between, his
famous book would have described an America unrecognizable as a modern democracy. In contrast,
shortly before Tocqueville’s actual visit to America in 1831, “the principal components for a
structure of norms and social values most appropriate to the workings of a capitalist, democratic,
equalitarian culture were fully in place . . . though not very much before then . . . .” Id. Thus, the
Dartmouth College case, litigated between 1817 and 1819, sits at a critical juncture in the creation
of modern America as “no subsequent rearrangements of value[s] or transformations in modes of
AND
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Viewed through this more comprehensive lens, the Dartmouth
College case highlights key aspects of the American story: the centrality
of religion and the struggle for religious tolerance; the centrality of
private property and the tension between majority rule and vested
property rights; the ongoing battle to properly define the public and
private realms; and the simmering competition for power and authority
both between the Supreme Court and other branches of the federal
government, and between the Supreme Court and state legislatures. All
of these aspects of the American story played out in the Dartmouth case
against the differing visions of the Federalists and the Jeffersonians,
and against the backdrop of the Yazoo land controversy and the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1801.
Moreover, the early history of Dartmouth College provides a case
study in the nature of wealth creation and business leadership before
and after the Revolution. Dartmouth College was founded by Eleazar
Wheelock, a preacher turned entrepreneur who used religion and
government grants to create both personal wealth and an important
institution. Eleazar’s successor in control of Dartmouth College—his
son John—illustrates the not-uncommon shortcomings of secondgeneration leadership; John’s missteps and personal failings alienated
his board and key constituents. The resulting battle for control of
Dartmouth College played out over nearly a decade before its resolution
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Viewed through this broader lens, previously unexamined
portions of the Dartmouth College opinions come into view, and the oftcited two sentences in Marshall’s opinion take on a new light as but part
of a larger and more nuanced analytical framework in which a
corporation is presumed ab initio to have the same constitutional rights
as natural persons, absent clear textual or other evidence to the
contrary. As the Article shows, what Marshall thought about
corporations changed dramatically as the Dartmouth College case
unfolded, as did the views of Joseph Story, writing in concurrence. What
Marshall and Story previously thought yielded to a richer
understanding of the corporation’s emerging role in American society
and the need to adapt the constitutional meaning of personal liberties,
property rights, and constitutional interpretation accordingly.
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I describes and
contextualizes the larger historical, legal, social, and cultural backdrop
in which the Dartmouth College controversy took place. Part II explores
thought and feeling could compare in magnitude to those that occurred in the fifteen years or so
prior to 1830.” Id.
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the genesis and prelitigation aspects of the Dartmouth College
controversy. Part III examines the Dartmouth College litigation in the
courts of New Hampshire. Part IV follows the case from the courts of
New Hampshire to the ultimate decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The conclusion follows.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
A. Summary Overview
The Dartmouth College case played out in New Hampshire, and
finally in the U.S. Supreme Court, against the backdrop of the
Federalist Party’s decline in power and influence, both nationally and
in New England. With Jefferson’s ascendancy in 1801, the Federalists
became a weak minority party nationally, and the party’s grip on New
England came under increasing attack by the DemocraticRepublicans. 7 The run-up to and War of 1812 brought a brief resurgence
in Federalist power, but this proved a last gasp. 8 The DemocraticRepublicans’ resounding victory in the 1816 presidential and
congressional elections marked the end of the Federalists as a national
political party. It also marked for extinction the Standing Order in New
England—the dominant political and cultural alliance between
Congregationalist ministers and leading citizens that traced its roots
and authority to the founding Puritans. 9
The struggle between the Federalists and their opponents in the
early years of the eighteenth century was rooted in earlier struggles
between the colonies and England that gave rise to the American
Revolution. 10 And that struggle was rooted in tensions between the
English people and their kings that gave rise to the Magna Carta in
1215, and the constantly evolving role of the common law and
Parliament as counterweights to the power of the Crown and as
7.
Phillip J. Lampi, The Federalist Party Resurgence, 1808-1816: Evidence from the New
Nation Votes Database, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 259 (2013).
8.
Id. at 261–66, 280.
9.
See id.; DONALD B. COLE, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1800-1851, at 30–
31 (1970). For the origins, nature, dominance, and decline of the “Standing Order” in New England,
see CHRISTOPHER GRASSO, A SPEAKING ARISTOCRACY: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONNECTICUT (1999); RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE:
CHARACTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN CONNECTICUT, 1690-1765 (1967); and PETER S. FIELD, THE
CRISIS OF THE STANDING ORDER: CLERICAL INTELLECTUALS AND CULTURAL AUTHORITY IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1780-1833 (1998).
10. See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776 (2d prtg. 1991) (detailing the root
causes that transformed American colonists from loyal English subjects in 1765 to revolutionaries
a decade later).
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expressions of the rights and privileges of the English people. 11 Central
to this multicentury conflict was the evolving nature of property rights,
including the rights conferred by the grant or existence of a
corporate charter. 12
B. The Colonists as English “People”
At England’s infancy, the concept of individual rights to liberty
and property was deeply iengrained in society:
Englishmen valued their rights to their personal liberty and property—rights that were
embedded in their common law. The common law had deeply held principles including,
for example, the notions that no one could be a judge in his own cause and that no one,
not even the king, could legally take another’s property without that person’s consent.
These rights and liberties belonged to all the people of England, and they adhered in each
person as a person. Their force did not depend on their written delineation; they existed
in the customary or unwritten law of England that went back to time immemorial. 13

Set against this were the prerogatives of the king, which
entailed both the absolute right to govern and the corresponding
responsibility to safeguard the English people. 14 It was the king’s
persistent infringement on the people’s liberties that gave rise to
periodic efforts to obtain the king’s written acknowledgment of a right
in question, which “in the early middle ages took the form of coronation
oaths and assizes and charters issued by the crown.” 15 This ongoing
struggle ultimately led to the Glorious Revolution and in 1689 to the
English Bill of Rights, whereby the king conceded important
governance rights and powers to Parliament. 16

11. Gordon Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421,
1422–25 (1999); P.B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James
I, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 144 (1959).
12. See, e.g., Catherine Patterson, Quo Warranto and Borough Corporations in Early Stuart
England: Royal Prerogative and Local Privileges in the Central Courts, 120 ENG. HIST. REV. 879
(2005) (discussing the use of quo warranto in the first half of the seventeenth century as a tool by
which the Crown controlled corporations); Robert H. George, The Charters Granted to English
Parliamentary Corporations in 1688, 55 ENG. HIST. REV. 47 (1940) (discussing the substantial
changes that occurred during King James II’s reign and “attack” on English parliamentary
corporations).
13. Wood, supra note 11, at 1423.
14. See id. at 1424:
[T]he king had his right to govern, and the people had their equally ancient and equally
legitimate rights to their liberties and their property. Indeed, it is perhaps not too much
to say that the whole of English constitutional history can be seen as a struggle between
these two competing sets of rights.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1425.
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Of critical importance is the English people’s understanding of
their Bill of Rights as the American Revolution approached:
So convinced were Englishmen in the decades following 1689 that tyranny could come
only from a single ruler that they could hardly conceive of the people tyrannizing
themselves. Once Parliament became sovereign, once the body that represented and spoke
for them—the House of Commons—had gained control of the crown authority that had
traditionally threatened their liberties, the English people lost much of their former
interest in codifying and listing their personal rights. Charters defining the people’s rights
and contracts between the people and government no longer made sense if the government
was controlled by the people themselves. . . . By the time of the American Revolution,
therefore, most educated Englishmen had become convinced that their rights existed only
against the crown. Against their representative and sovereign Parliament, which was the
guardian of these rights, they existed not at all. 17

Importantly, the Glorious Revolution and the English Bill of
Rights did not change the hierarchical nature of English society.
English people of all sorts understood that the Revolution and its
benefits skewed heavily in favor of landholders and what in America
would be seen as “the better sort.” 18 Thus, the rights of the English
“people” were primarily the rights of landholding men, and those rights
respected and reinforced the social hierarchy. 19
In the decade immediately preceding the American Revolution,
Parliament with the king’s support rolled out a series of acts that a
critical mass of colonists viewed as violations of their rights as
Englishmen. 20 Infringement of rights granted via corporate charters—
returning to the repugnant actions that had marked the reigns of James
I and James II—were central to the growing view. 21 Colonists saw their
corporate rights as especially vulnerable in light of Parliament’s
disregard for the charters of the City of London, the Massachusetts Bay
colony, the province of Quebec, and the colony of Grenada. 22 This
concern heightened when Parliament enacted the East India Company
Act of 1773, imposing fundamental changes on the corporation that bore
its name. 23 The colonists’ worst fears came to pass with the passage of
the Massachusetts Government Act of 1774, which amended the
Massachusetts Charter of 1691 to severely curtail colonists’ self-

17. Id. at 1425–26.
18. 1 HARRY L. WATSON, BUILDING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: A NARRATIVE HISTORY TO 1877,
at 140 (2018).
19. Id. at 139–40, 164–68.
20. The initial flurry of parliamentary actions included the Stamp Act of 1765, the Quartering
Act of 1865, the New York Restraining Act of 1767, and the Townsend Revenue Act of 1767. MAIER,
supra note 10, at 51–60, 113–16, 145–49.
21. See id. at 186 (“Now charters seemed no more respected by British authorities than the
rest of the law.”).
22. Id. at 183–87.
23. Id. at 187.
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governance rights. 24 Parliament’s repeated assaults on corporate
charter rights, and the king’s disdain for the colonists’ pleas for his
intervention, were a significant factor in pushing the colonists to the
point of open rebellion. 25
C. The American Revolution and the Constitution—the Colonists
Become Americans and the Rights and Privileges of the “Better Sort”
Are Contested
In the conduct and immediate aftermath of the American
Revolution, the relationship between the individual and the state, and
the nature of individual liberties and property rights, faced an
American reconceptualization of the English constitutional system.
Before the Revolution, rights and obligations were viewed as a contract
between two equals—Parliament (as representative of the people) and
the king—and there was little distinction perceived between public and
private spheres:
[E]ven as late as the eve of the Revolution the modern distinction between public and
private was still not clear. The people’s ancient rights and liberties were as much public
as private, just as the king’s rights—his prerogatives—were as much private as they were
public. So-called public institutions had private rights and private persons had public
obligations. 26

Moreover, the obligations of public service corresponded with
one’s place in the social hierarchy in which landowning was a dominant
factor. Public office, including military service, was uncompensated,
and the ranks were filled hierarchically, with the king at the top as
England’s largest landowner. 27
Before the Revolution, the hierarchical rights of the “better sort”
were similarly entrenched in the American colonies, and once called or
elected to service in a particular post, there was a strong expectation of
permanent tenure, akin to vested rights in property. 28
24. Id. at 218.
25. Id. at 186–87, 225.
26. Wood, supra note 11, at 1429.
27. See id. at 1429–30:
Indeed, everyone in the society had an obligation to help govern the realm
commensurate with his social rank—the king’s being the greatest because he stood at
the top of the social hierarchy. Thus important offices were supposed to be held only by
those who were already worthy and had already achieved economic and social
superiority. Just as gentlemen were expected to staff the officers’ corps of the army, so
were independent and wealthy gentlemen of leisure and education expected to supply
leadership for government.
28. See BUSHMAN, supra note 9, at 268 (“The assumption had always been that ‘Gentlemen
of approved Capacity and Fidelity’ were to remain in office, however unpopular their actions, so
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The Revolution destroyed the contractual and hierarchical
underpinnings of American colonial society. Gone was the automatic
respect and right to govern to which the better sort felt entitled.
Moreover, there was nothing resembling a king for the assemblage of
former colonies; instead the common interests of the newly independent
states were entrusted to a joint-venture-like confederacy of limited
scope and power. Within each newly independent state, the legislatures
assumed the power and authority of the English Parliament unchecked
by a king, and also unburdened by Parliament’s perceived role as
defender of the people against the predations of a wayward king. In a
word, each state fashioned itself a republic, and the ascendancy to
political power of “middling men” and men of the lower classes put in
doubt the governance and property rights of the “better sort” who had
dominated colonial life before the Revolution. 29
Unchecked by a king, colonial and then state legislatures
showed little restraint in confiscating the property of British loyalists 30
and, during the Confederacy, passing laws abridging the property
rights of creditors. 31 Concern that unbridled state legislative authority
threatened the liberties and property rights of the better sort was one
of the main reasons that the young nation, led by those who later
became predominantly identified as Federalists, jettisoned the Articles
of Confederation, replaced it with the Constitution, and included
therein the Contract Clause. 32
While concern for untrammeled state legislative power was a
clear impetus in the creation of the new Constitution, the desire to
temper state legislative power was balanced by fear of creating a central
government that would fall prey to the perceived failings of the English
system that had led to the Revolution; this fear fueled the separation of
long as their character was unimpeached.”); 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 253 (“Colonial gentlemen
had assumed that most voters would defer to men of wealth, education, and social distinction.”).
29. Wood, supra note 11, at 1432–35; 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 230. The natural
submission to the rule by the “better sort” before the Revolution was visceral and widespread, as
recounted by Reverend Devereux Jarrett, the son of a carpenter, in his autobiography. 1 WATSON,
supra note 18, at 199–200:
[W]e were accustomed to look upon, what were called gentle folks, as beings of a superior
order. . . . A periwig, in those days, was a distinguishing badge of gentle folk—and when
I saw a man riding the road, near our house, with a wig on, it would so alarm my fears,
and give me such a disagreeable feeling, that I dare say, I would run off, as if for my
life. Such ideas of the difference between gentle and simple, were, I believe, universal
among all of my rank and age.
30. 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 184, 216; Brett Palfreyman, The Loyalists and the Federal
Constitution: The Origins of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 35 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 451, 452–53 (2015);
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 6, at 10.
31. 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 216–18.
32. Wood, supra note 11, at 1434–35.
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federal-government power into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches, so that neither the federal government as a whole, nor any of
its constituent parts, would be a new source of tyranny and invasion of
individual liberties and property rights. 33
D. The Federalists and the Jeffersonians
During the Washington and Adams Administrations, concern
that the federal government would be a new source of tyranny competed
with fears that unchecked democracy would lead to destruction of the
young nation. The Revolution and its aftermath had engaged and
empowered ordinary citizens, and they did not want to go back to the
days in which they lived in awe of, and in submission to, the “better
sort.” 34 On the other hand, the Federalists, under a facially neutral
Washington and the clearly Federalist Adams, viewed political
associations and democratic participation of ordinary citizens with
great suspicion, and this fear increased as the French Revolution moved
quickly from a seeming affirmation of the ideals of the American
republic to chaos and the slaughter of political opponents. 35 But the
actions taken to thwart perceived risks of sedition caused a popular fear
that the Federalists were intent on recreating the old hierarchical,
perhaps even monarchical system. 36 Jefferson’s election signaled a
resounding rejection of the Federalists, who would never again hold the
presidency or a majority in either house of Congress. 37
The Federalists, however, remained in control of the Supreme
Court. 38 From this bastion, they would strongly influence the
development of American society and provide a counterbalance to the
Democratic-Republicans. 39 Among the important questions which the
33. 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 220–26.
34. See id. at 200 (“Except in a few places . . . ordinary white men would no longer submit to
the worst pretensions of self-styled gentlemen.”).
35. WATSON, supra note 18, at 242–43, 272 (discussing the political positions of the
Federalists).
36. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC 20 (1971) (stating that the Jeffersonians viewed the Federalists as “tories and
monarchists dedicated to the subversion of the principles of 1776”).
37. But see Lampi, supra note 7, at 280 (stating that reports of the Federalists’ “early demise”
have been greatly exaggerated, and that “in the two decades following Jefferson’s election
Federalists staged an amazing electoral comeback”).
38. See ELLIS, supra note 36, at 14 (“[Because Washington and Adams] view[ed] their
Jeffersonian critics as a morally reprehensible faction bent on overthrowing the government and
destroying the constitution, . . . [their] appointments to the national judiciary went exclusively to
members of the Federalist party . . . .”).
39. See id. at 3–68.
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Supreme Court would face almost immediately, and would continue to
face up and through the Dartmouth College case, was the old question
of vested rights in an American context—the authority of Congress or a
state legislature to undo judicial appointments, land grants,
or charters.
1. The Judiciary Act of 1801, Vested Rights in Judicial Offices, The
Early Years of the Marshall Court
The Judiciary Act of 1801, enacted in the closing days of the
Adams Administration, became an early point of tension; one of its
reforms was to abolish the existing federal circuit courts and establish
six new circuit courts with sixteen new circuit judgeships, thereby
relieving Supreme Court Justices of circuit court responsibilities. 40 The
Act also created original federal jurisdiction for cases in law and equity
that had been exclusively the domain of state courts. 41 When Adams
moved in the last days of his presidency to quickly fill these and other
vacant judicial posts with Federalists, while separately appointing
John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Judiciary Act
of 1801 became fodder for Democratic-Republican outrage. 42
Jefferson, who favored decentralization, agricultural interests,
and state power, saw the Federalists as seeking to remove their
defeated leaders to positions in the federal judiciary and to use that
bastion to pursue their nationalist, mercantile, and business-favoring
agenda through expanded federal jurisdiction. 43 Not surprisingly, one
of the first concerns of the new Democratic-Republican controlled
Senate was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, thereby eliminating the
sixteen newly created circuit courts, and effectively removing from
office the occupant jurists, who otherwise would have served for life,
absent impeachable conduct. 44 Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire,
later to be an advocate for the trustees in the Dartmouth College case,
was one of the federal judges so appointed who was effectively removed

40. Jed Glickstein, Note, After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of the Judiciary
Act of 1801, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 543, 546 (2012).
41. C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC, THE CASE OF
FLETCHER V. PECK 1–5 (1966).
42. Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 494–95, 519–21 (1961).
Ultimately, only thirteen of Adams’s nominees accepted office and were confirmed; Jefferson filled
two of the posts with Democratic-Republicans and left one unfilled. Glickstein, supra note 40, at
543, 548–49 .
43. See Turner, supra note 42, at 494 (“The Federalists have retired into the judiciary as a
stronghold . . . and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and
erased.”).
44. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
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from office on July 1, 1802. 45 To Federalists, this action seemed a
violation of fundamental principles, a violation of vested property
rights, and perhaps a violation of the Contract Clause. 46
This tension over the Judiciary Act of 1801 came to an early head
in the person of William Marbury, to whom Adams had extended a lastminute appointment as a justice of the peace for the District of
Columbia. Marbury’s commission was undelivered before the Jefferson
Administration took power, and the new secretary of state, James
Madison, refused to issue it. Marbury sought mandamus from the U.S
Supreme Court to compel Madison to issue the commission. 47
Marbury’s petition gave the Federalist Party–dominated Court,
and Chief Justice Marshall, an opportunity to wage war against the
recently empowered Democratic-Republicans, but such a move would
have further incited Jeffersonian wrath. In Marshall’s first great
opinion, the Court adroitly claimed for itself the right of judicial review,
while avoiding a conflict with the new administration. 48 Marshall
asserted that Marbury had a “vested legal right” in the judicial office to
which he had been appointed. 49 However, Marbury had filed his petition
in the wrong court; the congressional provision that facially granted the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over Marbury’s claim was itself
unconstitutional. 50 Despite Marshall’s favorable opinion on the
substance of Marbury’s vested rights claim, the remedy available and
the limits imposed on legislative power were unclear. 51 Uncertainty and
disputes about the nature of a judicial officer’s vested rights would be
an important issue in the Dartmouth College controversy and the
Dartmouth College case.

45. Turner, supra note 42, at 497–98. Then-Secretary of State John Marshall was
instrumental in Smith’s appointment to the Court. JOHN H. MORISON, LIFE OF THE HON. JEREMIAH
SMITH, LL.D. 143–45 (Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1845).
46. Glickstein, supra note 40, at 549–50; James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219,
220, 224–27 (1992).
47. O’Fallon, supra note 46, at 220.
48. 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 255.
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
50. Id. at 173–80; 1 WATSON, supra note 18, at 255.
51. The circuit judges removed through the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 seriously
considered—but ultimately chose not to file—a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of their
removal. Glickstein, supra note 40, at 558–78.
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2. The Yazoo Lands Controversy, Fletcher v. Peck, Joseph Story’s Role
in the Vested Rights Debate, and Story Joins Marshall on the
Supreme Court
Exacerbating tension over the Judiciary Act of 1801 was the
Yazoo lands controversy. After the Revolution, Georgia claimed
ownership of a huge tract of land west of the Chattahoochee River
known as the Yazoo lands, a claim challenged by various Indian tribes
and by the national government. 52 In 1795, Georgia’s legislature
granted thirty-five million acres of the Yazoo lands to four companies
engaged in the type of land speculation common in the latter stages of
prerevolutionary America and the early years of the new republic. 53 A
public uproar ensued, and the subsequent contest for control of the
Georgia legislature featured charges that the Yazoo grants were the
product of legislative corruption. 54 One year later, on February 13, 1796,
the newly elected Georgia legislature passed an act revoking the Yazoo
land grants. 55 On that same day, the New England Mississippi Land
Company (‘‘the New England Company”), formed specifically for the
purpose of speculating in Georgia lands, and in which many prominent
New England citizens were investors, purchased eleven million plus
acres of the Yazoo lands for $1,138,000. 56 When news of the repealing
act arrived, the New England Company was left with essentially
unmarketable and worthless title to the Yazoo tract. 57
The New England investors immediately claimed vested rights
in the purchased Yazoo lands and threatened litigation. 58 Their claim
was supported by the legal opinion of Alexander Hamilton “that
Georgia’s attempted repeal was barred by the provision of the United
States Constitution forbidding a state to impair the obligation of
contracts.” 59 The New England Company’s litigation threats further
fueled Jefferson’s outrage over the 1801 Federal Judiciary Act. If that
act were allowed to stand, the federal courts would have jurisdiction
52. MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 1–5.
53. Id. at 1–7. “Speculation in lands was the most absorbing American enterprise during the
later Colonial, the Revolutionary, and the early Republican periods.” DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG,
LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF LAND 321 (1972) (quoting THOMAS PERKINS ABERNATHY, FROM
FRONTIER TO PLANTATION IN TENNESSEE 19 (1932)).
54. MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 7–15; FRIEDENBERG, supra note 53, at 167–68 (“There is proof
that almost all of the legislators of Georgia were bribed, either directly by money or through a
speculative interest.”).
55. MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 7–15.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 10–15.
58. Id. at 20–69; FRIEDENBERG, supra note 53, at 269.
59. GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 25
(1970).
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over lawsuits seeking to validate the Yazoo land grants. Repealing the
Judiciary Act returned jurisdiction over such suits back to the state
courts. 60
In 1802, Georgia ceded its western land claims, including the
contested Yazoo tracts, to the United States. 61 Now Yazoo land
claimants had access to the federal courts, which repeal of the 1801
Judiciary Act had denied, and they soon arranged for a lawsuit,
undoubtedly collusive, to be filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, styled Fletcher v. Peck. 62 Peck had sold
Fletcher 1,500 acres of Yazoo land. 63 In the bargain and sale contract,
Peck covenanted that his title ran from the Georgia legislature’s 1795
Act and that “[t]he title to the premises so conveyed by the State of
Georgia . . . had been in no way constitutionally or legally impaired by
virtue of any subsequent legislation of the State of Georgia.” 64 Fletcher
argued that the Georgia legislature’s 1796 Act cut off Peck’s title; Peck,
echoing Alexander Hamilton, argued that Georgia’s 1796 repealing act
was an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights the 1795 Act had
created. 65 In 1807 the Massachusetts Federal Circuit Court ruled in
Peck’s favor on vested rights grounds. 66 The case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which in 1809 found the pleadings to be
defective, but allowed correction, and held the case over to be reargued
during its 1810 term. 67
Concurrently with the litigation in Fletcher v. Peck, the New
England Company pressed Congress to grant compensation. Bills were
introduced and voted on in 1804, 1805, and 1806, but despite President
Jefferson’s backing and desire for compromise, failed to garner
necessary support, primarily due to the opposition of Virginia
Congressman John Randolph, a hardline anti-Federalist. 68
60. MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 57–58.
61. Id. at 35.
62. Id. at 53–55. “Beyond any doubt the case of Fletcher against Peck was a collusive suit, an
arranged case between friendly ‘adversaries’ acting on behalf of the New England Mississippi Land
Company.” Id. at 54.
63. Id. at 54.
64. Id. at 54–55.
65. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
66. MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 55–56.
67. Id. at 59–68.
68. Id. at 37–49.
Randolph saw the land speculators as a species of the financial capitalists whom he
despised [and believed that] Federal recognition of the claims would mean a repudiation
of the validity of the Georgia repeal act, and this ran counter to his conviction that
federal powers under the Constitution should be strictly construed so as not to trespass
on the more important rights of the states.
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At this point the New England Company turned to then twentyseven-year-old Joseph Story, hiring him in 1807 to lobby Congress. 69
Story, a lawyer and politician already renowned for his intellect, had
overcome his membership in the Democratic-Republican Party to earn
the trust and respect of prominent New England Federalists, including
the principal investors in the New England Company. 70 Story travelled
to Washington in May 1807 and again in January 1808, taking the
opportunity not only to walk the halls of Congress, but also to meet with
President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison, to attend
sessions of the Supreme Court, and to frequently meet and dine with
the Justices at the boarding house lodgings they shared. 71
It was in the last of these pursuits that Story and Marshall
discovered themselves kindred spirits. They shared a love of
conversation and poetry, the travails of working with publishers, a deep
admiration of George Washington, and “[t]here were common bonds in
their Unitarianism, in an apprehension of the extremes of the
Jeffersonian faith, and, above all, in a reverence for the judicial
process.” 72 Importantly, they shared an appreciation for the matter
which brought Story to Washington: the insecurity of land titles if state
legislatures could ignore and counteract grants from a previous
sovereign. 73 In the 1790s Marshall and his brother had made
substantial investments in Virginia lands, the titles to which were
traced to Baron Fairfax. 74 The Virginia legislature subsequently
refused to recognize the validity of Baron Fairfax’s claim, confiscated
the property, and purported to sell it to other investors. 75 The title to
some of those lands was still in dispute in 1810 and would not finally
be decided until 1816. 76 Undoubtedly Marshall and Story commiserated
and discussed the similar troubles of the New England Company and
its investors. 77
Id. at 41; see also DUNNE, supra note 59, at 50 (“Jefferson in power dismissed as metaphysical
subtleties the [strict construction and states’ rights] doctrines he formerly preached, and on the
Yazoo case he threw his weight on the side of practical compromise.”).
69. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 57 (1985).
70. Id. at 55–58.
71. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 47–59; see also NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 66. As Story
described in 1808, “I daily spend several hours [at the Supreme Court] and generally, when
disengaged, dine and sup with the judges.” MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 68.
72. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 58.
73. MAGRATH, supra note 41, at 73–74.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation: The Background of Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1996 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 36, 48.
77. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 57.
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Story’s lobbying efforts with Congress were wholly
unsuccessful. 78 However, in 1810 he was again called into the service of
the New England Company, this time as an attorney to represent the
defendant, Peck, at the final argument before the Supreme Court, held
on February 15, 1810. 79 This honor further signaled Story’s ascendancy
to the very top of any list of America’s leading lawyers. 80
On March 16, 1810, Marshall delivered the Court’s unanimous
opinion upholding the circuit court’s judgment in Peck’s favor and
stating in the strongest terms possible the protections the Constitution
afforded to vested property rights: 81
In this case the legislature may have had ample proof that the original grant was obtained
by practices which . . . would have justified its abrogation so far as respected those to
whom crime was imputable. But the grant, when issued, conveyed an estate in fee-simple
to the grantee, clothed with all the solemnities which law can bestow. This estate was
transferrable; and those who purchased parts of it were not stained by that guilt which
infected the original transaction. 82
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be disguised
that the framers of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United
States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield
themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to
which men are exposed. The restrictions on the legislative power of the states are
obviously founded in this sentiment; and the constitution of the United States contains
what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state. No state shall pass any
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. 83
[Therefore], the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are
common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the
United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so
purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void. 84

Story’s relationship building in Washington soon bore further
fruit as James Madison appointed him to the Supreme Court in
November 1811. 85 Story took office in 1812 at the age of thirty-two,
delighted that he would now be able “to pursue, what of all things I
admire, juridical studies.” 86
78. Id. at 58–59.
79. Id. at 73–74.
80. Id. at 73. For the date of oral arguments in Fletcher v. Peck, see ANN ASHMORE, SUP. CT.
OF THE U.S., DATES OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND ARGUMENTS: UNITED STATES REPORTS
VOLUMES 2 – 107 (1791–1882), at 9, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/datesofdecisions.pdf
(updated Dec. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RK9P-PBUC].
81. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
82. Id. at 87, 134–35.
83. Id. at 137–38.
84. Id. at 139.
85. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 80–81; NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 70–71.
86. NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 71.
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Story and Marshall, already friends, would become judicial
soulmates and the dominant architects of constitutional law
jurisprudence for the next decade; each would play central roles in
determining the reach of the decision in Fletcher v. Peck, and the
Dartmouth College case would become the crucible for deciding the
extent to which the Contract Clause protected judicial tenure and other
statuses and grants, including state-granted corporate charters. 87
II. THE GENESIS AND PRELITIGATION ASPECTS OF THE DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE CASE
A. The Founder—Eleazar Wheelock
Born in Windham, Connecticut, in 1711, Eleazar Wheelock
(hereinafter “Eleazar”) at a young age exhibited great scholarly
promise, which his father, a successful farmer and church deacon,
nourished with the best instruction available. 88 At some point in his
mid-teens Eleazar had a religious conversion experience and
determined to devote his life to the “work of the gospel.” 89 In 1735, after
completing studies in classics and religion at Yale College, Eleazar was
ordained minister of the Second Congregational Church in Lebanon,
Connecticut, less than ten miles from his hometown, Windham. That
same year he married Sarah Davenport Maltby, a widow with three
young children. 90
Eleazar’s first decade in Lebanon was a whirlwind of religious
preaching and fervor, coupled with managing the twenty-five-acre
homestead given to him by his parish, and, to supplement his income,
creating and maintaining the Latin School, a college preparatory
academy for local youth. 91 Almost immediately he became a friend of
Jonathan Edwards and a key participant in the Great Awakening. 92 He
quickly achieved prominence as one of Connecticut’s three most sought-

87. See Morgan D. Dowd, Justice Story, the Supreme Court, and the Obligation of Contract,
19 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 493, 493–96 (1968); NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 78–83
88. WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN PULPIT: TRINITARIAN CONGREGATIONAL
397 (N.Y., Robert Carter & Bros. 1859); DAVID MCCLURE & ELIJAH PARISH, MEMOIRS OF THE REV.
ELEAZAR WHEELOCK, D.D. 11–13 (Newburyport, Edward Little & Co. 1811). Eleazar followed in
the early footsteps of his great-great grandfather, a graduate of Cambridge University and an
“eminent preacher of the gospel” who migrated to the colonies in 1637 to escape “persecution for
nonconformity to the established religion.” MCCLURE & PARISH, supra, at 11–13.
89. MCCLURE & PARISH, supra note 88, at 13; see also SPRAGUE, supra note 88, at 398.
90. DICK HOEFNAGEL, ELEAZAR WHEELOCK AND THE ADVENTUROUS FOUNDING OF
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 4 (2002).
91. Id. at 5–15.
92. GEORGE M. MARSDEN, JONATHAN EDWARDS: A LIFE 216–21 (2003).
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after itinerant preachers. 93 Unfortunately, that participation and
prominence caused tension between Eleazar and the Standing Order,
many of whom viewed the popular evangelists as fanatical,
disrespectful, and dangerous to public order. 94 This blowback caused
Eleazar to abandon itinerant preaching and turn his excess energies to
addressing the economic wellbeing and security of his family, and to the
Latin School. 95 It was in this latter endeavor that he first encountered
Samson Occom, a nontraditional student who would later become
central to Eleazar’s entrepreneurial endeavors. 96
In 1743, Eleazar agreed to take Samson Occom into the Latin
School. 97 Occom, a then nineteen-year-old Mohegan Indian, had been
converted to Christianity by Eleazar’s brother-in-law and sought
Eleazar’s instruction so that he could better read and understand the
Bible, and could then return to his native community as a missionary. 98
After four years under Eleazar’s tutelage, Occam departed as an
Eleazar devotee, and with a knowledge of English, Latin, Greek, and
the scriptures, which enabled him to receive ordination as a minister
without the normal requirement of college education. 99
It is unclear exactly when Eleazar hit upon the idea of creating
a charity school for the education and Christianizing of Indian youth.
Undoubtedly, though, the idea sprang from his experience with the
Latin School and with educating Occom, and from the opportunity
presented by the French and Indian War, which commenced in 1754.
For many years the English government and charitable benefactors had
shared an interest in Christianizing and civilizing the Indians on whose
lands the colonists steadily encroached, and to that end competed with
the French and the Jesuits who instead offered Catholicism and a much
more limited intrusion into Indian lands. The prevailing English
strategy was to send English missionaries into Indian country to do this
work, but with the war’s outbreak it was no longer safe for missionaries
to follow that path. 100 Eleazar offered a different plan—send Indian
youth to me and I will educate and Christianize them to be missionaries
who will be accepted back into their communities to spread the gospel
93. JAMES DOW MCCALLUM, ELEAZAR WHEELOCK 8–38 (1939); HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at
5–9; MARSDEN, supra note 92, at 216–21, 320, 323.
94. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 19–41.
95. MCCLURE & PARISH, supra note 88, at 20.
96. HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 9–15.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. MCCLURE & PARISH, supra note 88, at 16–17; HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 12–13.
100. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 75–78; HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 16–17; FRIEDENBERG,
supra note 53, at 96.

1664

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1625

and the ways of the English. 101 Samson Occom was Eleazar’s Exhibit
A—an example of the type of Anglified Indian missionary that his
school would produce. 102
In pursuit of this new endeavor, Eleazar took in his first two
Indian students in 1754. 103 Concurrently, he began to have great
success in obtaining charitable gifts to support this activity. 104 One of
the most important early donors was wealthy farmer Joshua Moor, who
gifted a dwelling and schoolhouse located on two acres of land adjoining
Eleazar’s homestead, and the school was thereafter “named Moor’s
Indian Charity School.” 105 Meanwhile, the Latin School continued the
instruction of non-Indian youths, but the line between the two schools
was blurry at best. 106
Moor’s gift became the personal property of Eleazar, operating
as what we would now call a sole proprietor, subject only to whatever
restrictions the deed of gift theoretically imposed. However, Eleazar
quickly found that, unlike Moor, many donors were unwilling to make
charitable gifts that could easily be used for purposes other than those
intended. As early as 1755 Eleazar was advised to seek a corporate
charter, which would provide donors with assurance that their gifts
would go to a permanent entity supervised by a board of trustees
appointed by the king, rather than directly or indirectly into Eleazar’s
coffers. 107 It would take Eleazar fourteen years to achieve the charter
he began seeking soon after.
Eleazar’s fundraising efforts touched potential donors not only
in the colonies, but also in England and Scotland. In 1765 Eleazar
dispatched Samson Occom and another emissary to England, a trip that
generated eleven thousand pounds in gifts and the creation of an
English trust to safeguard the use of the donated funds; one of the
prominent trustees was Lord Dartmouth. 108 Eleazar also set up an

101. BAXTER PERRY SMITH, THE HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 11–12 (Bos., Houghton,
Osgood & Co. 1878); MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 75–78.
102. HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 16–18.
103. MCCLURE & PARISH, supra note 88, at 23.
104. Id. at 23–25.
105. Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted).
106. HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 10–33.
107. JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 21–24 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1971) (1895); FRANCIS N. STITES,
PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC GAIN: THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE, 1819, at 2–3 (1972);
HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 20.
108. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 150–66; HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 30–31.
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American trust to which many colonial gifts were funneled. 109 These
trusts were not wholly satisfactory to either Eleazar or his donors. 110
As Moor’s Charity School grew, so did Eleazar’s ambitions,
which coincided with the rapid expansion of Connecticut and the allure
of land and land speculation, which began to grip the colonies in the
three decades before the Revolution. During this period, land companies
sprang up as speculative intermediaries seeking profit from resale,
rather than from personal settlement and use. Because the lands in
question were often claimed by more than one colony, by both the
English and the French kings, and by various Indian nations, this
speculative activity would generate numerous competing and uncertain
land titles. 111 This practice was to play out later in the Yazoo land fraud
that was to play such a pivotal role in American law and politics,
culminating with the case of Fletcher v. Peck. 112
In Connecticut, frontier land speculation centered on the
Susquehanna Company, formed in 1753 to appropriate the Wyoming
valley in what is now northeastern Pennsylvania, land that Connecticut
claimed under its Royal Charter of 1662. 113 In New Hampshire and
what is now Vermont, land speculation centered on grants made by the
royal governors of New York and New Hampshire. 114 Further south, the
speculative activity centered on the Ohio Land Company and the Ohio
territory, and that speculative activity was so threatening to the French
and affected Indian nations that it was a primary cause of the French
and Indian War. 115 At that war’s end in 1763, settlement on America’s
frontiers became relatively safe, and Eleazar sought in earnest to
capitalize on the value of Moor’s Charity School. 116
Land speculation in New England essentially involved buying
the right to create townships and selling that land at a profit to settlers.
A township with amenities was more likely to attract settlers,
increasing the value of speculators’ land. 117 As Eleazar had come to
109. MCCLURE & PARISH, supra note 88, at 25.
110. HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 30–32; STITES, supra note 107, at 3–4.
111. FRIEDENBERG, supra note 53, at 109–36.
112. See supra Section I.D.2 (describing how competing claims for the Yazoo lands led to
Joseph Story’s rise to prominence and the Supreme Court’s affirmation of property rights).
CONNECTICUTHISTORY.ORG
(Apr.
29,
2015),
113. The
Susquehanna
Settlers,
https://connecticuthistory.org/the-susquehanna-settlers/ [https://perma.cc/SXD7-879G].
114. FRIEDENBERG, supra note 53, at 73–84, 311–13.
115. Id. at 95–103.
116. England’s attempt to restrain westward settlement via the Proclamation of 1763 in order
to avoid further costly skirmishes or outright war with Indian nations would be one of the causes
of the American Revolution. See id. at 109–99.
117. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 59–62, 73–78 (1920).
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realize, he had assets of great value to land speculators—the ability to
provide budding townships both a ready-made school and a number of
congregants eager to resettle wherever Eleazar might go. 118 And the
value of his assets would be even greater if he could offer not just a
preparatory academy but a full-scale college.
Foreshadowing the way modern entrepreneurs play one political
jurisdiction against another in search of the best deal and design
business plans to fit investors’ preferences, Eleazar began offering his
school, now described as including a budding college, to competing
townships and colonies in return for land grants and a corporate
charter. 119 The horse trading with various competing locations played
out over more than a decade, with the Susquehanna Company and
various towns and colonies making firm offers or expressing
strong interest. 120
Ultimately, Eleazar struck a bargain with John Wentworth, the
royal governor of New Hampshire. 121 Wentworth wanted settlers in the
western Connecticut valley and needed an excuse to build a road from
Portsmouth to the interior of the colony. He also wanted for New
Hampshire the amenity that Massachusetts and Connecticut had long
possessed—a college. Eleazar, who had dreamed of founding a college,
offered both a credible plan to expand his existing school, and a
substantial group of followers who would relocate to New Hampshire.
To induce Eleazar to provide these benefits to New Hampshire,
Wentworth offered a corporate charter and substantial land grants for
both the prospective college and for Eleazar personally. 122
The charter was not the product of royal fiat in its design.
Wheelock prepared the first draft in his own hand, apparently advised
by four lawyers, and Wentworth then inserted substantial changes
advised by his own lawyer. 123 Each side eventually compromised, as in
modern business deals. Ultimately, the charter, issued in 1769 by
Wentworth as the agent of King George, incorporated twelve persons as
The Trustees of Dartmouth College, granted that incorporated body the
right to self-perpetuate, and named Eleazar as president. 124 While the
118. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 188.
119. Id. at 167–76.
120. HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 36–38; MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 112–19. Expressions
of interest extended from Nova Scotia to the southern colonies, leading Eleazar to exclaim in his
correspondence, “We can have the pick of America.” MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 113 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
121. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 167–76.
122. Id. at 167–73; LAWRENCE SHAW MAYO, JOHN WENTWORTH: GOVERNOR OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE 1767-1775, at 105–07 (1921).
123. See MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 167–73.
124. See id. at 172–76.
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charter gave the president control of day-to-day operation of the
College, it vested ultimate power and authority in the incorporated
trustees. 125 Eleazar had hoped to have a majority of the original
trustees composed of his nominees. 126 Wentworth, however, insisted on
splitting the incorporated board fifty-fifty, naming Eleazar, five of
Eleazar’s nominees, and six persons holding colonial offices at the
pleasure of the king and owing primary loyalty to the king, including
Wentworth himself. 127 The charter also granted Eleazar the power to
name his successor as president by provision in his last will and
testament. 128
The exact location for the College was not specified in the
charter, and several townships in New Hampshire competed for
selection. Eleazar eventually preferred, and prevailed on Wentworth to
accept, what is now Hanover in westernmost New Hampshire as the
winning location. 129 Whether it was part of Eleazar’s calculus or not,
the location would play a key role in the evolution of Dartmouth College.
Hanover was on the banks of the Connecticut River, which later would
become the boundary between New Hampshire and Vermont. The
College would become a central actor in the religious and social life of
the community that straddled the river, and would be able to draw
support, including land grants, not only from New Hampshire but also
from the emerging political entity that would become Vermont.
Importantly, Governor Wentworth made good on his promise of land
and autonomy for Wheelock and the College—“a district three miles
square, called Dresden, was created, to be under the immediate
jurisdiction of Dartmouth College, and special jurisdiction over this
little empire was given to [Eleazar] as its magistrate.” 130
In 1770, Eleazar and the initial cadre of Dartmouth College
faculty, students, and family members trekked to Hanover, and by fall
had constructed the first College buildings and commenced College
125. As was to become important in the later Dartmouth College case, the charter actually
incorporated twelve persons as “the Trustees of Dartmouth College” with the authority as body
politic to hold and administer the property of the corporation. References hereafter to the “Trustees
of Dartmouth College” are to the incorporated body. References to “trustees,” are to the natural
persons holding those positions at a given time.
126. As Eleazar had early written to one of his legal advisors, he no longer wanted to be subject
to the whims of independent trustees. He wrote: “I am quite Sick of the tho’t of conducting a
Charity School by a Body—they Won’t attend so as to understand it—they are diffident—too
Sudden and peremptory in their Conclusions before they have well weighed matters . . . .”
HOEFNAGEL, supra note 90, at 26.
127. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 28–37.
128. Id. at 53.
129. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 176.
130. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 65.
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operations. 131 Eleazar was the center of this new domain. “[Eleazar’s]
personal friends from Connecticut swarmed up the valley and located
above and below him on both sides of the river. Fifty-two people from
Connecticut settled Hanover, and eight hundred families from
Connecticut gathered in a few towns on the New Hampshire side
alone.” 132 For his devoted flock and the College students and faculty,
Eleazar continued his preaching in collaboration with the existing, but
previously struggling, Hanover town church, over whose affairs he soon
had much influence. 133
The theoretical threat to Eleazar’s control of the College
represented by Governor Wentworth and his five appointees to the
board never developed, both because Wentworth was immediately a
devoted supporter of the College and because with the coming of the
Revolution, he and the British-loyalist trustees were de facto removed
from the board and eventually replaced with nominees of Eleazar’s
choosing. 134 Effectively, then, the College, the College Church, and the
Dresden district adjoining Hanover were under Eleazar’s personal and
paternal sway from the outset.
Finally with the authority and autonomy he had long sought,
Eleazar would spend his remaining years nurturing Dartmouth
College, preaching and ministering to his devoted flock in the local
church, keeping the College afloat in the politically and fiscally
challenging early years of the American Revolution, and quietly
building his personal estate. He worked tirelessly in all of these roles
until almost the moment of his passing. 135 At his death in 1779, he
would bequeath to his legatees “sums, which at that time, would have
been considered an ample fortune.” 136
B. The Second President—John Wheelock
It is difficult to identify the exact starting point of the tension
between Dartmouth’s second president, John Wheelock (hereinafter
“John” or “Wheelock”), and the College’s trustees that made the famous
Dartmouth College case inevitable. However, it is not without merit to
view the starting point as the death of John’s father, Eleazar. 137
131. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 178–82.
132. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 65.
133. 1 FREDERICK CHASE, A HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AND THE TOWN OF HANOVER,
NEW HAMPSHIRE 7, 188–89 (John K. Lord ed., Cambridge, John Wilson & Son 1891).
134. MAYO, supra note 122, at 129–30; 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 318, 556.
135. MCCALLUM, supra note 93, at 181–205; 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 217–395.
136. MCCLURE & PARISH, supra note 88, at 123; see also 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 559.
137. STITES, supra note 107, at 6; 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 563.
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In his last will and testament, executed twenty-two days before
his death, Eleazar named John, one of his younger sons by his second
marriage, to succeed him in office as president and trustee. 138 This
appointment came as a surprise and likely a shock to John. Eleazar had
not kept secret prior drafts of his will in which he had named other
children or associates to be his successor, and had not told John of his
final plans. 139 Had John immediately accepted the presidency, perhaps
his relations with the other trustees would have been strong at the
outset rather than strained. Instead, John made the trustees court him
for over a year before agreeing to accept the appointment, which,
during that interregnum, left the College adrift and its survival at
heightened risk. 140
But perhaps even John’s immediate acceptance of the presidency
would not have changed the course of events. John was but twenty-five
years old at his father’s death, lacked training in theology, and lacked
his father’s personal magnetism, religious stature, and earned respect.
Thus, when John finally assumed the presidency, he was without some
of the good will and unquestioned right to lead and command that
Eleazar had enjoyed and hoped to transfer to his successor, and he faced
at the outset a group of trustees not completely under his sway. 141
To his credit, once in office John proved to be a very sound
businessman and steered the College from the brink of financial ruin to
solid ground. 142 As a member of Dartmouth’s first graduating class and
a former tutor at the College, John did have a strong understanding of
the institution and its mission. Moreover, John actually wanted to be a
teacher and scholar, and he embraced that role. 143
Nonetheless, he gradually lost ground with the trustees. Like his
father, he was by nature an autocrat, and tried to ensure that anyone
hired as a professor or nominated to fill a vacancy among the trustees
was a loyal personal friend. 144 Like his father, he pursued private profit
along with enhancement of the College’s well-being. Though not a
minister, John, like his father, sought to exert control over local church
affairs. However, John’s preference for his own personal interests in
138. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 44; 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 561–62.
139. 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 563.
140. Id. at 564; STITES, supra note 107, at 6–7.
141. 2 JOHN KING LORD, A HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE: 1815-1909, at 2–3 (1913).
142. SMITH, supra note 101, at 77–80.
143. Id. at 76 (“In 1772, he was appointed a tutor, and was devoted to the business of
instruction until the beginning of the Revolution.”).
144. Eleazar had soured on independent trustees through his experiences with a trust set up
to protect donors. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing Eleazar’s aversion to
accommodating independent trustees’ impulsive tendencies).
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these matters seemed to take center stage rather too often and too
insistently. 145 And John’s lack of personal charm and punctilious
manner did not help matters. 146
The seeds for the eventual break in relations can certainly be
traced to the twenty-three-thousand-acre land grant John obtained
from the Vermont legislature in 1785. Half of the grant was to the
trustees for the support of Dartmouth College and half was to John as
president of, and for the support of, the Moor’s Charity School. 147 When
Eleazar had negotiated with Governor Wentworth for land grants, some
of which he sought for himself, there was no conflict of interest; he was
a sole proprietor, and it was for him to decide how to divide
opportunities and properties between different activities for which he
was solely responsible. But when John negotiated with Vermont for
lands, he was wearing three hats, and only one of them was looking out
for the interests of Dartmouth College. The grants for the benefit of the
unincorporated Moor’s Charity School, in which the trustees claimed no
interest, could, under John’s sole control, end up in his personal estate
unless Vermont kept a watchful eye. It is unknown whether the
trustees initially questioned why the Vermont legislature had divided
the land grants as they did, or whether John had induced the legislature
to favor the Moor’s Charity School, then devoid of any Indian or charity
students if in existence at all, to the disadvantage of the College. 148 And,
in any event, since the College’s part of the land grants covered more
than half of the College’s operating expenses, the trustees might have
been inclined at the time to be grateful rather than suspicious of
John’s actions. 149
But in 1799, the Vermont legislature began to question whether
the 1785 land grants were valid and eventually took steps to void
them. 150 John believed trustee Nathaniel Niles, who had been a member
of the Vermont legislature in 1785, was an agent of Vermont interests
in this matter, and tension between the two men thereafter infected the
board and gradually led to a complete breakdown of trust between a
majority of the board and John. 151 One asserted basis for voiding the

145. STITES, supra note 107, at 7–10; 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 560–61; 2 LORD, supra note
141, at 6 (“[A]t the end of his presidency he was the possessor of over twelve hundred acres of land
that had belonged to the College.”).
146. STITES, supra note 107, at 6.
147. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 44; SMITH, supra note 101, at 80.
148. STITES, supra note 107, at 8–9.
149. 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 626.
150. Id. at 621, 624–25.
151. 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 618. Niles was everything that John Wheelock was not—
having served in Congress and as a member of the Vermont Supreme Court, and being “an
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1785 grants was that the Moor’s Charity School had not been in
existence either at the time of the grant or since. The real concern was
that Vermont was getting little benefit from the grants, and the belief
that John was using the portion of the grants he controlled for personal
rather than charitable purposes. 152 It was now impossible for the
trustees not to question why the Moor’s Charity School was a grantee
in the first place.
Prior to the Vermont challenge, the only activity for which
Moor’s Charity School resources were being used was running a college
preparatory school for Hanover-area youth, none of whom were charity
cases. It would be tempting to conclude that what was really in
operation was the Latin School created by Eleazar in the 1730s, rather
than Moor’s Charity School. 153 To counter the charge that this was not
really a charity school, John recruited two Indian students and one
needy white student, and widely publicized both the existence and
importance of the mission of Moor’s Charity School. 154 The controversy
between John and Vermont dragged on for eight years. In 1806, the
Vermont legislature offered to settle the dispute: if John and the
trustees would agree to surrender the 1785 land grants under which
each had control of half of the land-grant income, Vermont would
reissue the grants directly to the Trustees of Dartmouth College for the
benefit of the College and Moor’s Charity School as the Dartmouth
board should see fit. John refused this compromise, which would have
entailed significant loss of personal control over the land grants and
likely would have resulted in a significant increase in the portion of the
land-grant income devoted to College purposes. 155 Vermont finally
agreed to leave the grants in place when, in 1807, John successfully
petitioned the New Hampshire legislature to incorporate him,
personally, as the president of Moor’s Charity School. 156 John’s conduct
with respect to the Vermont land grants, and especially his use of
political capital in petitioning the New Hampshire legislature for a
personal corporate charter, rather than accepting the compromise
offered in 1806, opened a gaping wound in his relationship with many
of the College trustees. 157
inventor, manufacturer, poet, lawyer, priest, physician, and metaphysician . . . [of whom] Jefferson
once said [ ] ‘He was the ablest man I ever knew.’ ” SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 82.
152. 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 618, 624.
153. Id. at 618.
154. Id. at 618–19; STITES, supra note 107, at 9.
155. 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 620–22.
156. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 45–47; 1 CHASE, supra note 133, at 625–26.
157. STITES, supra note 107, at 9.
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As the Vermont problems moved towards resolution, new
problems surfaced. The College had been trying for a number of years
to hire a professor of divinity, with the expectation that such person
would not only instruct at the College, but also pastor the town church.
Yet, when the position was filled in 1804, John obstinately refused to
allow new Professor of Divinity Shurtleff to assume that role. Instead,
John demanded that Shurtleff share the position with Professor Smith,
the president’s strongest ally on the Dartmouth faculty, who had been
serving as pastor for many years. Perhaps John questioned Shurtleff’s
loyalty, as he was a friend of Nathaniel Niles, or perhaps he sensed that
Shurtleff would never be as subservient as John demanded. In any
event, though a majority of the Hanover members of the church strongly
desired to have Shurtleff be their sole pastor, they were outnumbered
by Vermont members of the church, who felt beholden to John and
yielded to his wishes, though many, too, wished to have Shurtleff as
their pastor. The vast majority of the Hanover members refused to
submit and continued to petition John to allow Shurtleff to be their
pastor. Despite the calls for compromise by two independent advisory
councils who were called in to mediate, John steadfastly refused. As a
result, most of the Hanover members made the decision to break away
and form a new church. 158
As the church controversy simmered, a majority of the trustees,
led by Nathaniel Niles, began to openly rebel and assert the governance
rights granted them under the charter. In 1809, they rejected John’s
nominee to fill a vacant trustee post and elected their own choice
instead. 159 In 1810, John nominated ally Elijah Parish to fill the vacant
language professorship. Parish, a minister in Byfield, Massachusetts,
was a stern, arrogant man and a staunch supporter of John and the
Standing Order. 160 The trustees appointed another candidate
instead. 161 In 1811, almost all of the Hanover members of the town
church formally departed and were officially recognized as a separate
congregation by regional Congressionalist authorities. Soon after,
Professor Shurtleff, disobeying John’s wishes, agreed to informally
pastor the breakaway church, and two of Dartmouth’s three other
faculty members soon joined the new congregation. 162 John viewed
these actions as the equivalent of treason, and sought the trustees’
support for a new College church to be housed in the small College
158. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 16–56.
159. Id. at 60.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 186–198 (discussing the relationship between Elijah
Parish and the Wheelock family).
161. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 60.
162. Id. at 32, 45, 60.
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chapel rather than share the spacious town meeting house with the
breakaway church. Further, he asked the trustees to confirm that as
professor of religion, it would be Professor Shurtleff’s obligation to
pastor the new College church. John justified his request on the grounds
of student needs, but it was obvious he hoped to damage the prospects
of the breakaway Hanover congregation. A majority of the trustees
refused to have the College’s resources used in this way, seeing it as
inconsistent with the charter’s promise to respect religious liberties. 163
To add insult to injury, and to prevent John from retaliating against
any dissenters at the College, the trustees also took away John’s
disciplinary powers. 164
For the next three years, John and the dominant faction on the
board coexisted in their roles. Each viewed the other with barely
masked hostility. Each bided their time: the trustees hoping John,
aging and in failing health, would resign; while John was secretly
calculating how to regain dominance. 165
C. The New Hampshire Judicial Controversy: The Brief Return to
Power of the Federalists.
As this uneasy truce played out, the political fortunes of the
Federalists took a turn for the better. Democratic-Republicans had
taken control of the New Hampshire executive and legislative branches
in 1805, and except for a brief return to shared control with the
Federalists in 1809, remained in power until the election of 1813. 166 As
the Democratic-Republicans took control in New Hampshire, William
Plumer, who four years later would play a pivotal role in the remodeling
of Dartmouth College’s charter, changed parties. As a member of the
Federalist Party, Plumer had served as speaker of the New Hampshire
House of Representatives and as a U.S. Senator. In 1812, heading the
Democratic-Republican ticket, Plumer was elected governor. His tenure
was to be short. 167 The economic and psychic impact of the War of 1812
on New England lifted Federalists’ boats throughout the region. In New
Hampshire’s election of 1813, the Federalists’ nominee for governor,
John Taylor Gilman, who was a Dartmouth College trustee, defeated
163. Id. at 57–60.
164. Id. at 61.
165. STITES, supra note 107, at 10–11.
166. COLE, supra note 9, at 21–26.
167. LYNN WARREN TURNER, WILLIAM PLUMER OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1759–1850, at 201–05
(1962); ALBERT H. HOYT, MEMOIR OF WILLIAM PLUMER, SENIOR 8–10 (Bos., David Clap & Son
1871).
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Plumer, as the Federalists also captured strong majorities in both
houses of the New Hampshire legislature. 168
Rather than proceed with some humility and respect for the
vanquished Democratic-Republicans, the now Federalist-controlled
legislature immediately moved to abolish the existing state courts and
create new courts in their place, thereby ending the terms in office of
the sitting New Hampshire jurists. 169 There were creditable policy
reasons for taking both steps, including the fact that the quality of some
of the sitting jurists was questionable to say the least. 170 But to the
public at large it looked exactly like the congressional DemocraticRepublicans’ repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1801, which
Federalists had derided as partisan politics of the worst sort and an
unconstitutional violation of the sitting jurists’ lifetime tenure. Now, it
was the Democratic-Republicans who righteously defended the sanctity
of judicial tenure and the Federalists who stood exposed as usurpers
of power.
The political backlash and public outrage, fueled by the
Democratic-Republican press, was immediate and intense. Newly
elected Federalist Governor John Taylor Gilman sought to quell the
uproar by appointing near-universally respected Federalist, Jeremiah
Smith, who had served as chief justice of the Superior Court of
Judicature from 1802 to 1809, as chief justice of the newly created
supreme court. Gilman implored Smith to accept the position. 171 “On all
sides, it was considered impossible for the new court to get under weigh
[sic], unless Mr. Smith would consent . . . .” 172
For Jeremiah Smith, the offer of appointment presented an
agonizing dilemma. The position was one that in normal circumstance
he would jump at. His highly successful career as a lawyer had been
interspersed with stints serving New Hampshire on the superior court,
for four terms as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and
for one term as governor. 173 But of all these roles, serving as an
appellate jurist had both given Smith more satisfaction and suited his
temperament and character better than his other pursuits. Indeed, the
only position he had enjoyed and treasured more than serving as chief
justice of New Hampshire’s highest court was his short-lived stint on
168. COLE, supra note 9, at 24–26; TURNER, supra note 167, at 204–05.
169. TURNER, supra note 167, at 225–26.
170. See MORISON, supra note 45, at 265 (“There were confessedly, in the old [court] system,
serious imperfections, which were remedied by the new [system]. . . . [B]ut the main object in
making the change undoubtedly was to get rid of incompetent judges.”).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 267.
173. See generally id. at 45–259 (discussing the career of Jeremiah Smith).
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the federal court of appeals as one of Adams’s so-called “midnight
judges.” 174 Hence Smith’s dilemma. He, like most Federalists, strongly
believed that repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act was unconstitutional
to the extent its effect was removing sitting federal judges from office. 175
He likewise believed that the New Hampshire Federalists’ actions in
abolishing the existing courts in order to remove all sitting judges from
office was both politically unwise and of questionable
constitutionality. 176 How, then, could he in good conscience accept
appointment as chief justice?
Leaders of the New Hampshire bar joined Governor Gilman in
imploring Smith to accept the post. 177 At the time, three of the most
respected members of the bar were Smith, Jeremiah Mason (then
serving a term as U.S. Senator), and the young Daniel Webster. 178 This
trio would later ride together as counsel for the Trustees of Dartmouth
College. 179 But at this crucial moment their lives intersected as Smith
agonized over what duty required. Mason’s entreaties perhaps carried
the day:
My only fear is respecting your acceptance. I am confident the success of the system will
depend on you. Should you decline, I cannot see how it will get into operation. . . . At all
events, you must in my opinion accept and hold it for a time, or prepare to see
disappointment and confusion ensue. . . . I will only add that Mr. Webster and others here,
entirely agree with me in the wishes I have expressed on this subject. 180

And a few days later:
I see, by the public papers, you have been appointed chief justice; I hope I shall soon see
that you have accepted. Nothing else will put down the clamor raised against the
system. 181

Reluctantly, Smith accepted appointment and the furor abated
somewhat, though two of the removed judges would constantly fan the
partisan flames for the next three years. 182
174. Id. at 146:
He used to say, it was the only office that he had ever greatly desired, or the loss of
which he had greatly regretted. In age he looked back on no part of his public life with
so much pleasure, though it was a pleasure accompanied always by the feeling, that in
losing the office he had been thrown out of the place best fitted for his improvement,
distinction, and usefulness.
175. Id. at 148–49.
176. Id. at 267.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 261.
179. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 61–62.
180. MORISON, supra note 45, at 267–68 (quoting Letter from Jeremiah Mason to Jeremiah
Smith (July 6, 1813)).
181. Id. at 268 (quoting Letter from Jeremiah Mason to Jeremiah Smith (July 6, 1813)).
182. Id. at 273–79; TURNER, supra note 167, at 226.
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D. The Final Breach and the Board Removes John Wheelock from
Office
With the judicial controversy somewhat under control, Governor
Gilman, as one of the Dartmouth trustees, now consented to another
act which would again fan partisan flames and ultimately contribute to
the Democratic-Republicans’ return to power in New Hampshire.
Whether in hopes of nudging him to retire or genuine belief that he was
no longer fit to teach, the trustees in November of 1814 relieved John
Wheelock of his cherished duties teaching the curriculum offered to
members of the senior class. 183
This proved the final straw for John. He had endured the
humiliation of losing control of the church his father had commanded.
Now he had lost control of his father’s other great creation. 184 And this
latest humiliation not only enraged John, but caused him to fear that
the trustees would soon take the ultimate step and formally dismiss
him as president, a final public indignity which he would seek to avoid
with all of his remaining energy and cunning. 185 John spent the
remainder of the year engaging in discreet conversations with his allies
and assessing and weighing his options. By the end of the year, he had
settled on a plan of action at the urging of, and to be carried out with
the assistance of, Elijah Parish. 186
Parish’s loyalty to John had deep roots. His family attended
Eleazar Wheelock’s church in Lebanon, Connecticut. 187 Parish was only
eight years old when Eleazar departed for Hanover to found Dartmouth
College, but even at that young age Parish had formed an abiding
conviction to follow in Eleazar’s pious footsteps. 188 One of his first steps
in that direction was to attend Dartmouth College, where he became
one of John Wheelock’s star pupils, graduating in 1785. 189 In 1787, with
John’s tacit support, the congregation in Byfield, Massachusetts, called
Parish to be their minister. 190 In that post, Parish would be a staunch
defender of the Standing Order and church authority. 191 Parish was
183. SMITH, supra note 101, at 90; 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 61.
184. STITES, supra note 107, at 12.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 12–13.
187. JOHN LOUIS EWELL, THE STORY OF BYFIELD: A NEW ENGLAND PARISH 161 (1904).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 162.
191. Id. at 161–65. Parish was met with immediate resistance from more liberal members of
the Byfield congregation who objected to his orthodox piety, similar to the resistance which Eleazar
Wheelock had experienced in his attempts to bring piety to the unsaved during and after the Great
Awakening. But Parish persevered, and dissident efforts were eventually squelched. Id.
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also an inveterate and outspoken Federalist. 192 From Jefferson’s
election through the remainder of his life, Parish would preach frequent
sermons condemning the Jeffersonians and their actions. In 1807, he
would blast the decision to embargo Great Britain. 193 In that same year,
Dartmouth College would award him an honorary doctor of divinity
degree. In 1812 and thereafter, he would rail against the war. His
sermons were frequently published and were in high demand to
Federalist audiences. 194
In short, Parish and John Wheelock were intellectual and
religious soulmates of long standing, who also shared a willingness to
engage in extended political combat with opponents. As they discussed
John’s options, their end goal was the restoration of Wheelock’s full
control and authority over the College, and the installation of Parish as
a faculty member to help carry on John’s and his father’s legacy.
The plan they agreed upon was calculating, shrewd, and
devious. Just as he had in 1807, John would appeal to the legislature
for help, this time to amend the College charter and take other actions
as necessary to ensure that a majority of the trustees were rightthinking and Wheelock-supporting. 195 John and Elijah assumed they
could count on Federalist support, and they intended to ensure even
broader support by writing and widely circulating a pamphlet setting
out their indictment of the trustees in a way that would appeal to
Democratic-Republicans, and quickly following up with a request
for legislative action before the trustees had a chance to rally
their forces. 196
The pamphlet, published in early May 1815, took two parts. The
first, entitled Sketches of the History of Dartmouth College and Moor’s
Charity School, with a Particular Account of Some Late Remarkable
Proceedings of the Board of Trustees, from the Year 1779 to the Year
1815 (“Sketches”), ghostwritten by John, but purporting to be the
account of a concerned citizen, was an eighty-eight-page recital of
Wheelock’s side of numerous disagreements with the trustees and a
detailing of various incidences of trustee misuse of College resources to
favor one religious faction over another, rather than to respect religious
liberties. 197 It purported, of course, to be the observation of one who had
192. See id. at 172 (“Parish believed the accession of the Democratic party to power [in 1801]
to be a great national calamity . . . and he spoke as he felt.”).
193. Id. at 171–72.
194. Id. at 170–75.
195. STITES, supra note 107, at 13.
196. Id. at 12–14.
197. Id. at 13.
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no dog in the hunt, acting only out of concern for ensuring that
Dartmouth College was governed to serve the interests of the public
rather than the selfish and partisan interests of the trustees. Attached
to the pamphlet was Parish’s ghostwritten, and purportedly objective,
Review of the facts and allegations set out in Sketches, which not only
sided with Wheelock’s ghostwritten “facts” but added a full-fledged
vilification of the trustees and the danger they posed to Dartmouth
College and the citizens of New Hampshire. 198
The pamphlet’s distribution had the desired immediate effect.
The editor of the leading Democratic newspaper, the Concord Patriot,
immediately published an editorial blasting the trustees for using their
power to make Dartmouth College a mere adjunct of the Federalist
Party, and cast John as a noble defender of the public, ignoring that he,
too, was a staunch Federalist. 199 John supported this account of
Federalist villainy and his own virtue in a ghostwritten letter to the
Patriot, purporting to be writing as a concerned member of the
Democratic-Republican Party. 200
The stage was now set to engage the New Hampshire
legislature. On June 1, 1815, at the legislature’s opening session, John
Wheelock presented his Memorial, with a copy of Sketches attached;
after summarizing the charges set out in Sketches, the Memorial
beseeched legislators to take appropriate actions to protect the public’s
interest in Dartmouth College, and in so doing acknowledged and
submitted his charter rights to the legislature’s sovereign power to do
with the College as it thought best: 201
To you, revered legislators! the writer submits the foregoing important considerations. He
beholds, in your Honorable body, the sovereign of the State, holding, by the Constitution,
and the very nature of sovereignty in all countries, the sacred right, with your duty and
responsibility to God, to visit and oversee the literary establishments, where the manners
and feelings of the young are formed, and grow up in the citizen in after life; to restrain
from injustice, and rectify abuses in their management, and, if necessary, to reduce them
to their primitive principles, or so modify their powers as to make them subservient to the
public welfare. To your protection, and wise arrangements, he submits whatever he holds
in official rights by the Charter of the seminary; and to you his invaluable rights as a
subject and citizen. 202

Wheelock closed his Memorial with a suggested course of action:
And as the Legislature have never before found occasion to provide, by any tribunal,
against the evils of the foregoing nature, and their ultimate dangers, he prays that you
would please, by a committee invested with competent powers, or otherwise, to look into

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

2 LORD, supra note 141, at 64–65.
Id. at 65–66.
STITES, supra note 107, at 14–15.
SMITH, supra note 101, at 90–94.
Id. at 93.
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the affairs and management of the institution, internal and external, already referred to,
and, if judged expedient in your wisdom, that you would make such organic improvements
and model reforms in its system and movements, as, under Divine Providence, will guard
against the disorders and their apprehended consequences. 203

In accordance with Wheelock’s request, the legislature appointed a
three-member committee of citizens (“Citizens Committee”), to
investigate “and to report a statement of facts at the next session of
the legislature.” 204
Wheelock and Parish had, indeed, stolen a march on the
trustees, who made tentative efforts to put their side of the story before
the public and considered dismissing Wheelock as president
immediately, as they strongly suspected he was the author of Sketches
and were angered by the duplicitous campaign he was waging. 205
However, the need to prepare for the coming Citizens Committee
investigation consumed much of their time, whereas Parish and
Wheelock, in effect, had been preparing their case for many months and
had effectively conditioned public opinion as to the righteousness of the
president’s cause. 206 Moreover, key supporters of the College urged
the trustees not to take precipitate action before the Citizens
Committee’s investigation. 207
The Citizens Committee convened in Hanover and over the
course of three days—August 16 to 18 of 1815—received and heard the
evidence that each side wished to be considered. 208 They then
adjourned, charged with reporting their findings to the legislature at
its next session, not to convene until June 1816. Faced with such
uncertainty, the trustees offered a compromise: if Wheelock would
publicly disavow the charges of trustee misconduct contained in
Sketches, he would “be retained in office so long as he lived.” 209 After
Wheelock refused this offer, the board began the process of dismissing
him from his positions as president, professor of history, and trustee,
which removals were accomplished at a meeting on the evening of
August 26, 1815, by the affirmative vote of eight of the trustees then in

203. Id.
204. STITES, supra note 107, at 16–17.
205. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 70: “I intend . . . to show that with the democrats he was a
democrat—with every sect of religionists he was one of them—with federalists he was a federalist,
and thus he descended to base means to make influence.” (quoting Letter from Thomas W.
Thompson, Tr., to Ebenezer Adams, Professor (Aug. 5, 1815)).
206. STITES, supra note 107, at 13.
207. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 94–97.
208. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 71–72.
209. Id. at 72; see also STITES, supra note 107, at 19.
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office (the “Octagon”). 210 Wheelock chose not to attend the meeting;
trustees Gilman (then governor of the state) and Stephen Jacob
formally dissented and protested these actions. 211 Two days later, the
trustees elected the Reverend Francis Brown, a College alumnus and
respected scholar, to replace Wheelock as president. 212
E. The Election of 1816—The Democratic-Republicans Regain Power
The trustees’ removal of Wheelock was to prove a political
nightmare for the Federalist Party in New Hampshire. With the
conclusion of the War of 1812 nearing, the Federalists’ main complaint
against Democratic-Republican leadership at the national level was of
swiftly receding impact. 213 At the local level, the Dartmouth controversy
was enabling the Democratic-Republicans to rekindle citizen outrage
over the 1813 court repeal and court packing, and to paint the
Federalists as defenders of religious orthodoxy and social elitism. 214
In June 1815, the Federalist Party had chosen not to renominate
sitting governor John Taylor Gilman as their gubernatorial candidate.
Instead they nominated prominent Federalist lawyer and sitting Court
of Common Pleas judge Timothy Farrar, Sr. 215 But Farrar, in his role
as Dartmouth College trustee, would two months later join the other
members of the Octagon in voting for John Wheelock’s removal from
office. 216 The resulting public outcry over Farrar’s involvement caused
the Federalists to seek another nominee. 217 Gilman, the sitting
governor, was the logical choice, particularly since as a Dartmouth
College trustee he had voted against Wheelock’s removal and written a
public protest. Gilman, however, was in no mood to be the party’s
fallback choice. Five other Federalists also refused the nomination,
which finally went to the aristocratic Anglophile James Sheafe, the
richest man in the state and an easy target for the DemocraticRepublicans. 218
In contrast to the Federalists, the Democratic-Republicans had,
in William Plumer, a popular and proven candidate. Plumer had been
210. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 72–78.
211. Id. at 72, 75, 77–78 (board had only eleven members from 1813 to 1816).
212. Id. at 78; STITES, supra note 107, at 21. Brown was not only a respected pastor and
scholar, but possessed “administrative talents, circumspection and diplomacy [which] made him
Wheelock’s opposite in practically every regard.” STITES, supra note 107, at 21.
213. STITES, supra note 107, at 22.
214. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 78–81.
215. TURNER, supra note 167, at 236.
216. Id. at 236–37.
217. STITES, supra note 107, at 23.
218. Id. at 23–24; TURNER, supra note 167, at 236–37.
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elected governor in 1812, turned out of that office in 1813 when the
populace chose John Taylor Gilman, and defeated by Gilman in his
attempts to regain the governorship in 1814 and 1815. 219 But Plumer’s
defeats had not been due to his perceived shortcomings, but rather due
to the short-lived rise of the Federalist Party throughout New
England. 220 Unlike his opponent, Sheafe, Plumer was the product of
humble beginnings. Without a formal college education, he had
nonetheless educated himself to become a Baptist preacher, a respected
lawyer, and an accomplished historian. 221 And, unlike Sheafe, Plumer
was a genuine progressive for his time, having repeatedly acted to
assert and defend religious and personal liberties. 222
As expected, the Dartmouth College controversy and the
Judiciary Act of 1813 were the central issues in the campaign, and
Plumer proved to be the perfect standard bearer given the issues and
the general resentment that had built up against the Federalists.
Plumer won the governorship easily, and his party captured both
houses of the state legislature with comfortable margins. 223 The public
and John Wentworth now waited to see how Plumer and his party
would legislate with regard to the two issues that had dominated the
election campaign.
F. The June 1816 Legislative Session—the Remodeling of the New
Hampshire Judiciary and Dartmouth College
1. Remodeling the Judiciary
How to proceed with respect to the judiciary was the simpler of
the two principal issues that Plumer faced as the legislature prepared
to convene. However, the actions taken with regard to the judiciary
were to have profound implications for the Dartmouth College
controversy itself.
In his inaugural address to the legislature on June 6, 1816,
Plumer’s message with regard to the judiciary was as expected. He
contended that the 1813 legislation abolishing the existing New
Hampshire courts, and thereby ending the terms in office of sitting
219. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 94–97.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. WILLIAM PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 50–51, 59, 112–13 (A.P. Peabody ed.,
Bos., Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1857); see also SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 76–78.
223. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 80–83; TURNER, supra note 167, at 237–38; PLUMER, supra
note 222, at 431–32.
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jurists, was an unconstitutional method of removal. 224 The judges who
had accepted office in the new courts in 1813 did so knowing that the
removal of the old judges was unconstitutional; therefore, the current
sitting judges were unfit to hold office and should be removed for cause
as allowed by the New Hampshire Constitution, and the prior court
system should be reinstated. 225 The Democratic-Republican-controlled
legislature agreed. 226 Before the session’s conclusion, the legislature
and the governor would exercise their joint authority to remove the
sitting jurists for cause. 227 Subsequently, the legislature would repeal
the 1813 judiciary legislation, the effect of which was to recreate the
Courts of Common Pleas and the Superior Court of Judicature which
previously existed. 228
Two of the seventeen sitting jurists removed from office were key
participants in the governance of Dartmouth College. 229
One was Dartmouth College Trustee, Octagon member, and
short-lived Federalist gubernatorial candidate, Timothy Farrar, Sr. 230
His son, Timothy Farrar, Jr., also a lawyer, and former law partner to
Daniel Webster, would play a key role in creating the court reports that
form our understanding of the Dartmouth College case. 231
The other was William Henry Woodward, John Wheelock’s
nephew, who held the offices of secretary and treasurer of Dartmouth
College. Despite the arguable hypocrisy involved in reappointing a
judge he had just removed for cause, Plumer would eventually appoint
Woodward as chief judge for District Two of the revived Courts of
Common Pleas, the district in which Dartmouth College was located. 232
Woodward would soon become a central actor in the Dartmouth College
controversy and would be the named defendant in the famous case.
Also removed from office was Jeremiah Smith, chief justice of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Thus, Smith again suffered the
same fate that repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1801 had
inflicted. 233 Smith would soon become one of the lawyers for the
Trustees of Dartmouth College in the litigation that would end in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

TURNER, supra note 167, at 244.
Id. at 244–45, 255; S. JOURNAL, June Sess., at 19–21 (N.H. 1816).
TURNER, supra note 167, 254–55.
Id.
Id. at 253–58; PLUMER, supra note 222, at 437–38.
N.H. S. JOURNAL at 147–48; 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 61–62.
TURNER, supra note 167, at 259–61.
See infra notes 398–411 and accompanying text.
PLUMER, supra note 222, at 445; TURNER, supra note 167, at 256–60.
MORISON, supra note 45, at 279; N.H. S. JOURNAL at 147.
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2. “Amending” the Dartmouth College Charter
During the 1816 election campaign, Plumer had given John
Wheelock’s supporters reason to believe that Plumer would be
supportive of legislative action to return John to the Dartmouth
presidency. 234 However, Plumer did not feel bound to John’s agenda.
Plumer had a sincere and overriding belief that universities should be,
and inherently were, public institutions, and this conviction was his
primary motivation. 235 Moreover, as he considered the charge he would
give to the legislature, Plumer had in hand the Citizens Committee’s
report which would be delivered to the legislature early in its session,
and Plumer knew the report would be a nonfactor in the legislative
deliberations concerning Dartmouth College. 236 Contrary to the hopes
of both sides in the controversy, the Citizens Committee had dutifully
summarized each side’s contentions and evidence, but had made no
findings of fact and offered no recommendations for resolving the
controversy. 237 Thus, Plumer knew that he had an opening to pursue
his own agenda.
In his inaugural address to the legislature on June 6, Plumer
emphasized the importance of education to a republic, the specific
importance of Dartmouth College to the citizens of New Hampshire,
and his agenda for new-modeling the College charter:
As [the Dartmouth College charter] emanated from royalty, it contained, as was natural
it should, principles congenial to monarchy. Among others it established trustees, made
seven a quorum, and authorized a majority of those present to remove any of its members
which they might consider unfit or incapable, and the survivors to perpetuate the board
by themselves electing others to supply vacancies. This last principle is hostile to the spirit
and genius of a free government. Sound policy therefore requires that the mode of election
should be changed, and that trustees in future should be elected by some other body of
men. To increase the number of trustees, would not only increase the security of the
college, but be a mean of interesting more men in its prosperity. . . .
The college was formed for the public good, not for the benefit or emolument of its trustees;
and the right to amend and improve acts of incorporation of this nature, has been
exercised by all governments, both monarchical and republican. . . .
These facts shew the authority of the legislature to interfere upon this subject; and I trust
you will make such further provisions as will render this important institution more
useful to mankind. 238

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

TURNER, supra note 167, at 235–36.
Id. at 244–45; PLUMER, supra note 222, at 439–40.
See TURNER, supra note 167, at 245–50.
Id. at 249–50.
N.H. S. JOURNAL at 26–28.
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Plumer then moved quickly to put a concrete proposal before the
legislature: The bill he initially proposed would remove all of the
existing trustees from office, create a new fifteen-member board of
trustees and a much larger board of overseers, with the members of
each board to be directly named in the Act. Vacancies in the board of
overseers would be filled by the governor and his council; vacancies in
the board of trustees would be filled jointly by the board of overseers
and the governor. Finally, the governor and his council would have the
right to visit the college every five years. 239
This radical transformation was more than either side to the
Dartmouth controversy had wanted, and each side independently
lobbied the legislature to both preserve the self-perpetuating power of
the College’s board of trustees and its autonomy from outside oversight,
and for a finding of facts favorable to their own side. 240 Hope of
achieving the last goal was dashed for both sides when the legislature
chose to focus only on reforming the charter. 241
After nearly three weeks of furious negotiations, the legislature
adopted a compromise bill that greatly disappointed the governor, as
none of the current trustees were removed, and the board of trustees
retained significant power to perpetuate itself in office. However, the
Octagon and supporters of the original charter were equally
disappointed. 242
Under the legislation adopted on June 27, 1816 (“the CharterAmendment Act”), the corporation was renamed Dartmouth University,
the board of trustees was increased from twelve to twenty-one, and the
governor was empowered to name the nine new trustees plus fill any
vacancies occurring before or during the first meeting of the new
board. 243 Thereafter, the board of trustees would have full power to
remove a trustee and to fill any vacancies whether arising from death,
retirement, or removal. 244 Additionally, a new twenty-five-member
board of overseers was created; the governor and his council were
empowered to name the initial overseers and to fill any subsequent
239. TURNER, supra note 167, at 248–49.
240. Id. at 251.
241. N.H. S. JOURNAL at 104–07. After the Citizens Committee’s Report was disseminated to
the legislature and debated, the Senate resolved on June 21, 1816, that the difficulties and
controversy at Dartmouth College were the result of defects in the charter, and that efforts should
be focused solely on correcting those defects so that future disharmony would not occur, rather
than on trying to determine who among the officers and trustees were most at fault for difficulties
which are primarily traceable to the defective governance provisions in the charter.
242. TURNER, supra note 167, at 18–20, 250–53.
243. TIMOTHY FARRAR, REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
AGAINST WILLIAM H. WOODWARD 18–22 (Bos., John W. Foster & West, Richardson & Lord 1819).
244. Id. at 21.
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vacancies, however arising. 245 The Act left the trustees with operating
control of the university. 246 However, significant trustee decisions, such
as the appointment, compensation, or removal of the corporation’s
president, other officers, or professors, or the erection of new building
or colleges, were subject to the board of overseers’ review and veto. 247
Significantly, the Charter-Amendment Act formally created two
corporate offices—treasurer and secretary—having the obligations
customary for such offices. 248 Additionally, however, the secretary and
the president now had public obligations to make reports to the board
of overseers and the governor. 249 Moreover, the governor and his council
were granted the power and responsibility “to inspect the doings and
proceedings of the corporation and of all the officers of the university,
whenever they deem it expedient—and they are hereby required to
make such inspection and report the same to the legislature of this state
as often as once in every five years.” 250
In the view of Plumer and the legislative majority, all that the
Act had done was amend the Dartmouth College charter. In the view of
opponents, there could be no amendment unless the Trustees of
Dartmouth College accepted it. 251 Perhaps neither side understood that
the actual effect of the legislation was for a period of time to leave the
original corporation—the Trustees of Dartmouth College—in existence,
and to bring to life a new, competing corporate body,
Dartmouth University.
G. The Post-Legislative Session Intrigue—Compromise, Submit, or
Fight?
As the conclusion of the legislative session neared, Governor
Plumer turned to the problem of filling the seventeen vacant judgeships
in the newly recreated courts. 252 Plumer was keenly aware of the
political problem that filling these posts presented, especially if he
appointed only Democratic-Republicans. Just as the appointment of the
respected Jeremiah Smith as chief justice had helped dampen the
uproar in the aftermath of the Judiciary Act of 1813, his removal from
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 18–22; TURNER, supra note 167, at 250–53.
TURNER, supra note 167, at 258.
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that post now was a particular problem. 253 Plumer sought his fivemember council’s agreement to have Federalist Jeremiah Mason
appointed to replace Smith as chief justice. 254 Mason was as esteemed
as Smith as both a lawyer and statesman; he had served New
Hampshire in the U.S. House of Representatives, was then serving in
the U.S. Senate, and, along with Smith and Daniel Webster, was at the
pinnacle of Federalist Party leadership. Indeed, Plumer had once
himself been at that pinnacle of Federalist leadership before his change
of parties, and he still valued the opinion and esteem of his former
leadership colleagues, Mason and Smith. 255
Despite Plumer’s entreaties, the council’s three DemocraticRepublican members would not accept Mason’s appointment. Instead,
the council offered commissions to serve on the Supreme Judicial Court
to two Democratic-Republicans, Samuel Bell and William Richardson,
the latter as chief justice; and one Federalist, George Upham. 256 In all,
Plumer initially obtained the council’s approval to fill the
vacant
judicial
posts
with
seven
Federalists
and
ten
257
Democratic-Republicans.
As Plumer focused on his judicial appointments and also made
appointments to the trustee and overseer positions created by the
Charter-Amendment Act, the College and its supporters considered
how to proceed. 258 As much as the Charter-Amendment Act was a
setback for the College faction, the controversy might have ended at this
point. The College had been operating well for nearly a year under
President Brown’s calm and skillful hand, and the Octagon and Brown
might have been content to allow control of the board of trustees to pass
to the new University board if they could be assured that President
Brown and the current professors would be allowed to continue their
competent service. 259 Had the key decisionmakers understood how
committed Plumer was to avoiding partisan division during his
administration, and how little he cared to vindicate Wheelock, they
might well have submitted to the Act. 260
But the Octagon, Brown, and the key faculty members—Adams
and Shurtleff—were leery of what was to come. Once in place, a new
majority could remove Wheelock’s enemies from the board of trustees,
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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Id. at 256–58.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259–61.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 257–59.
SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 110–11.
SMITH, supra note 101, at 100–01.
TURNER, supra note 167, at 258–60.
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from the presidency, and from positions on the faculty. 261 And some of
Plumer’s appointments as University trustees were especially
worrisome. In particular, the appointments of William Woodward and
Professor of Medicine Cyrus Perkins, both strong Wheelock supporters,
were interpreted in the worst possible light, and as signs of disrespect
for the positions and service of President Brown and Professors
Shurtleff and Adams. 262
Letters to President Brown reflect the Octagon’s concerns and
evolving plans. On July 4, 1816, Charles Marsh, a Vermont-based
College trustee, and cousin of Jeremiah Mason, 263 wrote:
I have no doubt in my own mind that the Act is altogether unconstitutional and must be
so decided could the question come before a competent and dispassionate court. . . . I now
wish that we had seasonably removed the secretary [William Woodward] so as to have
possessed ourselves of the records. 264

On July 15, 1816, trustee Asa McFarland reported his canvas of leading
legal authorities:
[Trustee Thomas] Thompson saw Judge Peabody, Mr. Mason, Webster and Farrar[.] They
gave it as their decided opinion that it would be the duty of the Trustees to maintain their
original corporate right, and try the issue. 265

On July 27, Marsh again wrote:
I still think it a great object to prevent their having a quorum, for in that case they can
do no official act, nor accept the grant. 266

As the College faction mulled its future course of action, Plumer
continued to struggle with judicial appointments. The Governor was
determined to heal the partisan divide if possible, and his judicial
appointments showed it, but many in the opposing party were urging
the Federalist nominees to refuse the proffered commissions.
Ultimately all but William Woodward declined to serve. 267 When
Federalist William Upham refused his commission as chief justice,
Plumer made a last-ditch effort to temper partisanship urging the
council to reconsider its refusal to appoint Jeremiah Mason, who was
as widely respected as Jeremiah Smith, as chief justice of the Supreme
261. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 113.
262. Id. at 110–12.
263. Id. at 76.
264. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 91 (quoting Letter from Charles Marsh, Tr., to Francis Brown,
President, Dartmouth Coll. (July 4, 1816)).
265. Id. at 92 (quoting Letter from Asa McFarland, Tr., to Francis Brown, President,
Dartmouth Coll. (July 15, 1816)).
266. Id. (quoting Letter from Charles Marsh, Tr., to Francis Brown, President, Dartmouth
Coll. (July 27, 1816)).
267. TURNER, supra note 167, at 260–62.

1688

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1625

Court of Judicature. Democratic-Republican William Richardson, who
had agreed to accept appointment as chief justice, enthusiastically
offered to instead serve as an associate justice if the council would
agree. 268 When the council acquiesced, Plumer on August 11, 1816,
wrote to Mason:
[P]ermit me to inquire if you are appointed Chief Justice . . . will you accept the office? It
has long been my desire that you should have that office, and I think it will be offered to
you, provided I have assurance you will accept it. It is an office worthy your ambition, and
one I hope you will hold till you are removed to the bench of the Supreme Court of the
United States. 269

It is interesting to speculate how the Dartmouth College case
would have been decided by a New Hampshire Superior Court of
Judicature acting with the Federalist, Jeremiah Mason, as its Chief
Justice Mason. However, by letter dated August 18, 1816, Mason
declined the position. 270
As Mason’s letter declining appointment was in transit to
Plumer’s home in Epping, Plumer was on his way to Hanover, where he
arrived on August 20 to prepare for the first meeting of the University
board. 271 It is unlikely that he learned of Mason’s decision for at least
several days thereafter, and may not have learned Mason’s decision
when the University trustees attempted to assemble for their first
meeting on August 26.
On August 23, the College trustees met. Though notified of the
meeting, neither William Woodward, who had been asked to bring with
him the College records, nor Governor Plumer, attended. 272 Likewise,
trustee and former governor Gilman, who had grown disenchanted with
both sides in the controversy, refused to attend, but agreed not to resign
and to remain neutral. Trustee Jacob, who had also opposed Wheelock’s
removal, also refused to attend as he planned to accept the authority of
the Act and attend the first meeting of the University board as one of
its trustees. 273 Effectively the College board now had nine working
trustees—the members of the so-called Octagon and President Brown
(the “College Trustees”). Without publicly tipping their hand, the
College Trustees informally decided to resist and frustrate the
implementation of the Act. 274
268. PLUMER, supra note 222, at 445.
269. JEREMIAH MASON, MEMOIRS OF JEREMIAH MASON (1873), reprinted in MEMOIR,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JEREMIAH MASON 1, 147 (G.J. Clark ed., 1940) (quoting
Letter from William Plumer, Governor of New Hampshire, to Jeremiah Mason (Aug. 7, 1816)).
270. PLUMER, supra note 222, at 446–47.
271. TURNER, supra note 167, at 263.
272. STITES, supra note 107, at 34–35.
273. Id. at 35 n.66.
274. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 93–94.
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On the morning of August 26, 1816, Governor Plumer walked to
the university library, the place where the College Trustees normally
met, in anticipation of holding there the first meeting of the University
Trustees. The door was locked. As the day wore on and his requests for
assistance were politely declined, Plumer realized that the College
Trustees and supporting faculty members would not provide access to
normal meeting spaces. The University board finally convened in
William Woodward’s college office at 5:00 p.m., only to find that the
College Trustees would not attend, leaving the new University board
two short of the required quorum of eleven. 275
On the morning of August 28, the College Trustees met and
formally asserted their right to be governed under the Charter of
1769. 276 After adjourning, the College Trustees then conducted
commencement under the authority of the old charter. 277 Frustrated but
undaunted, the quorum-short University Trustees continued to meet in
Hanover through August 30, making detailed plans for the University
that they expected would be ratified whenever the University board
could achieve a quorum. They then adjourned until September 17, in
hopes that they would be able to validly organize at that time. 278
Meanwhile, the College Trustees began to prepare for litigation
and to perfect their claims under the 1769 charter. The linchpin of their
strategy focused on William Woodward, who had fully defected to the
University camp, but continued to hold the title of College secretary and
treasurer and to possess the College charter, seal, and official records,
including titles to and other evidence of the College’s property (the
“College records and property”). 279 Beginning in June 1816, Woodward
had refused to attend trustees’ meetings. 280 Moreover, he had attended
the quorum-deficient meetings of the University Trustees held August
26–30 as both a newly appointed trustee and as the University’s
treasurer and secretary. Since Woodward had chosen to accept the
authority of the Charter-Amendment Act, the College Trustees resolved
that Woodward had abandoned his offices, and, if not, he was to be
removed. To the vacant posts of secretary and treasurer, the board
appointed Mills Olcott and instructed him to demand that Woodward
275. Id. at 96; TURNER, supra note 167, at 264.
276. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 95–96 (“Resolved, that we the Trustees of Dartmouth College
do not accept the provisions of [the Act to Amend the Charter] but do hereby expressly refuse to
act under the same.”).
277. Id. at 96–97.
278. Id. at 97.
279. Id. at 97–99.
280. Id. at 99.
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turn over the College records and property, and, if Woodward refused,
to take whatever legal actions he deemed necessary to obtain those
items. 281 On October 7, 1816, Olcott made formal demand of Woodward
for the College records and property, and Woodward refused on the
basis that the College Trustees had no authority to act for the
remodeled University, and that Woodward continued to rightfully carry
out his duties under the authority of the properly amended charter. 282
As the College Trustees made their demand on Woodward,
Plumer was grappling with how to proceed. The Charter-Amendment
Act had authorized the governor to convene a meeting of the University
Trustees on August 26 but had made no provision for adjourning or
calling a meeting at a later day in the event a quorum could not be
garnered. 283 As the full implications sank in of his probable lack of
authority to call a meeting after the twenty-sixth or to appoint trustees
after that date, the Governor cancelled the September 17 adjourned
meeting of the University board. The Governor sought legal support for
the proposition that such powers were implied in the CharterAmendment Act and decided to seek a supportive advisory opinion from
the superior court. 284
The legislature already had a special session scheduled for
November 1816. Having developed what would prove to be a wellfounded doubt that the superior court would give him the advisory
opinion he needed, 285 Plumer decided to seek additional legislation to
cure the flaws in the Charter-Amendment Act and quell the College
Trustees’ rebellion. 286
By Act approved December 18, 1816, Plumer obtained what he
needed to activate the University Trustees. That Act: (1) gave the
governor power to convene the first meeting of the University Trustees
at any time and place, and to fill any vacancy in the board occurring
prior to the next annual meeting; (2) decreased the required quorum for
a meeting of the trustees from eleven to nine; and (3) gave trustees
authority to adjourn their initial meeting, as necessary, until the
requisite quorum could be assembled. 287

281. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 116–17.
282. Id. at 117–18.
283. TURNER, supra note 167, at 265.
284. Id. at 266; SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 118–19.
285. The advisory opinion of the Superior Court delivered on November 25, 1816 would
confirm the governor had no authority to call a new meeting or fill vacancies occurring after August
26. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 119–21.
286. Id. at 121–22.
287. FARRAR, supra note 243, at 23–24.
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By subsequent Act, approved December 26, the legislature
further strengthened Plumer’s hand. 288 First, it imposed substantial
civil penalties on persons presuming to act as a Dartmouth officer,
professor, or trustee under authority of the old charter, or on persons
who “shall in any way directly or indirectly wilfully impede or hinder”
persons carrying out those offices under the authority of the CharterAmendment Act. 289
Secondly, the December 26 Act further amended the CharterAmendment Act to negate the College Trustees’ claimed removal and
replacement of William Woodward:
And be it further enacted, That the person or persons who sustained the offices of secretary
and treasurer of the trustees of Dartmouth College, [immediately prior to] the passage of
the [College-Amendment Act] shall continue to hold and discharge the duties of those
offices, as secretary and treasurer of the trustees of Dartmouth University, . . . [and] shall
in his office have the care, management, direction, and superintendence of the property
of said corporation, whether real or personal, until a quorum of said trustees shall have
convened in a regular meeting. 290

These new legislative actions were of great concern to the
College faction. On January 3, 1817, President Brown wrote to one of
his key legal advisors, Timothy Farrar, Jr.:
Now, what shall we do? One of these four courses must be taken. We must either keep
possession and go on to teach as usual, without any regard to the law, or, withdrawing
from the college edifice and all the college property, continue to instruct as the officers of
Dartmouth College; or, relinquishing this name for the present, collect as many students
as will join us, and instruct them as private but associated individuals; or else we must
give all up and disperse. Will you give us your opinion, what may be duty or what
expedient, as soon as convenient? Particularly, will you give us your opinion whether,
supposing this oppressive act to be judged constitutional, we should be liable to the fine,
if we instruct as the officers of Dartmouth College, relinquishing, however, the college
buildings, the library, apparatus, etc. 291

Similar inquiries and discussions took place between and among
the College faction and its supporters throughout the month as the
College Trustees awaited Plumer’s next move. The sentiment soon
settled on ignoring the new legislation for now and responding to events
as they should unfold.
Resistance depended, of course, on the resolve of the College
faculty. Four of the institution’s six faculty members—including,
importantly, Brown, Shurtleff, and Adams, who comprised all of the

288. Id. at 26.
289. Id. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
290. Id. at 25–26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
291. SMITH, supra note 101, at 108 (quoting Letter from Francis Brown, President, Dartmouth
Coll., to Timothy Farrar (Jan. 3, 1817)).
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academic officers—committed to staying the course. 292 Brown
emphasized his resolve by also turning down an offer to become the
president of Hamilton College at a significantly higher salary. 293 Of the
medical faculty, Dr. Cyrus Perkins, who had already agreed to become
a University trustee, was a defector, and Dr. Nathan Smith, though a
College supporter, was unwilling to risk the statutory penalties and
decided to withdraw from the institution. 294 However, Professor Mussey
remained in full support of the College. 295
But resistance ultimately depended on the resolve of the College
Trustees. In that regard, President Brown and Farrar, Jr., became the
driving forces in convincing the College Trustees that litigation was
ultimately unavoidable, and indeed, to be welcomed. Farrar, Jr.
summed up the evolving consensus in his letter to President Brown
dated January 26, 1817:
We cannot, and I believe none of us wish to avoid a legal decision of the question whether
the State legislature can destroy or disannul the former charter, and the sooner that
question is decided the better it will be for the College. 296

In reaching this consensus, the College Trustees were “controlled
mainly by the positive will of the younger Farrar and the influence of
[President] Brown.” 297
Meanwhile, armed with his expanded authority, Plumer
proceeded to fill vacancies that had occurred among his original
appointments to the University board and to prepare for a meeting of
the University Trustees, which he noticed to be held in Concord
beginning on February 4, 1817. 298
At this point, John Wheelock played his last trump card to
ensure that the University would perpetuate his legacy. The College
Trustees had delayed ousting Wheelock and had put up with his abuses
for longer than they otherwise would in hopes that Wheelock would
deliver his promised legacy to the College. Likewise, Plumer and the
University faction were keen to obtain Wheelock’s bounty for the
resource-strapped institution, obviating any obligations that might
otherwise fall on the state of New Hampshire to care for its new child.
On February 1, Wheelock made good on part of his long-promised gifts,
deeding seven valuable properties to the Trustees of Dartmouth
292. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 106.
293. Id. at 107.
294. Id. at 106.
295. Id. at 106–07.
296. Id. at 108–09 (quoting Letter from Timothy Farrar to Francis Brown, President,
Dartmouth Coll. (Jan. 26, 1817).
297. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 132.
298. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 111.

2021]

WHAT WAS THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
CASE REALLY ABOUT?

1693

University. 299 However, such gifts came with the express proviso that
title would revert to his estate if the Charter-Amendment Act were
invalidated other than “with the consent of the Board of Trustees as
then constituted.” 300 And the gifts came with the implied proviso that
his will could still be changed to favor or disfavor the University. 301
On February 4, 1817 Plumer and some of the University
Trustees arrived in Concord for the scheduled first meeting of the
University Trustees, but a quorum was not yet obtainable. 302 Meeting
on the same day, and anticipating the actions to be taken by the
University Trustees, the College Trustees formally decided to proceed
with litigation aimed at invalidating the Charter-Amendment Act. 303
On February 6, with a quorum finally obtained, the University
board began the process of removing from office President Brown, the
other College Trustees, and Professors Adams, Smith, and Shurtleff. 304
Without waiting for the removals to be completed, John Wheelock’s sonin-law, the Reverend William Allen, was appointed professor of logic
and metaphysics. 305 On February 22, the University Trustees
completed the removal of Brown, Shurtleff, and Adams, and
reappointed Wheelock as president. 306 Since Wheelock was by then too
ill to actually serve, they at the same time appointed his son-in-law,
William Allen, to serve as interim president. 307
Brown and the others removed from office prepared a detailed
response to the University Trustees’ actions, explaining why such
actions were unlawful and how the College would respond to a takeover
of its facilities, which they distributed to the public on February 28:
[If University agents use force to] seize on the college buildings and property . . . the
undersigned will make no forcible resistance, it not being a part of their policy to repel
violence by violence. They will quietly withdraw when they cannot peaceably retain
possession, and with the best accommodations they can procure will continue to instruct
the classes committed to them until the prevalence of other counsels shall procure a repeal
of the injurious act, or until the decision of the law shall convince them of their error, or
restore them to their rights. 308

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 116 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 111.
SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 132.
2 LORD, supra note 141, at 111.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 112, 115.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 114–15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The next day, the University faction seized control of
Dartmouth’s facilities. 309 Dartmouth’s spring term was about to
commence, and the College faction quickly repaired to spaces located
throughout Hanover, including faculty and student lodgings, and the
attached libraries, which contained almost as many books as the main
library that had fallen into University hands. 310 Almost all of the
students and faculty continued to support the authority of the College
Trustees, as did the vast majority of Hanover residents. At first only
two students, and never more than ten or so, would choose to be
educated by the trustees claiming under the Charter-Amendment Act
despite the obvious advantages the University had via access to seized
facilities. This state of affairs would continue until the resolution of the
Dartmouth litigation. 311
On April 4, 1817, John Wheelock died, content that Dartmouth
University was in the hands of family and friends and that his legacy
would be preserved. 312 As expected, Wheelock left Dartmouth
University a sizeable bequest, having a value approximately double the
gifts he had made on February 1. 313
III. THE LITIGATION IN THE NEW HAMPSHIRE COURTS
A. Preliminaries—The Issue Is Joined
As Plumer and the University Trustees began the process of
giving birth to Dartmouth University in place of Dartmouth College and
in giving Wheelock the vindication he sought, the College Trustees, on
February 8, 1817, finally instituted the legal action that they had been
contemplating for months. 314 Styled as an action in trover, the College
Trustees sought to recover from William Woodward certain of the
College records and property—its seal, its official records, and its books
of accounts—that Woodward, acting as secretary and treasurer of the
University, had refused to relinquish. 315
The suit, properly filed in the Court of Common Pleas for
Grafton County, posed an immediate problem. William Woodward was
309. Id. at 120–21.
310. Id. at 132. The University faction would attempt to take the student libraries by force in
November 1817 only to be rebuffed by the students. The ensuing charges and countercharges badly
damaged the University faction in the court of public opinion. Id. at 131–38.
311. See id. at 121–38, 155–57 (discussing the continuing financial difficulties of the College
faction due to its lack of students).
312. STITES, supra note 107, at 43.
313. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 115–16; SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 141.
314. STITES, supra note 107, at 41.
315. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 142–43.

2021]

WHAT WAS THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
CASE REALLY ABOUT?

1695

not only a defendant in the case but also, thanks to Governor Plumer,
the chief judge for the Court of Common Pleas in Grafton County. It
would be ethically and politically unacceptable for either Woodward, or
one of the two judges who served under him, to hear and decide the
case. Negotiations between the parties ensued, and it was agreed to
fashion a jointly acceptable special verdict to be adopted by the Court
of Common Pleas and forwarded to the state’s highest court, the
Superior Court of Judicature, for decision at its May term in Haverhill,
New Hampshire. 316
Ultimately it was agreed to frame the issue so that whoever
prevailed in the litigation would have a virtually unchallengeable right
to act and control the school, its properties, and its fortunes. If the
Charter-Amendment Act, as amended, was determined to be lawful,
then William Woodward would prevail, and the University Trustees
would have been validly empowered and fully entitled to take all of the
actions done on and since their first meeting on February 6, 1817. 317
Conversely, if the College Trustees had rightfully resisted the authority
of the Charter-Amendment Act, then the Charter of 1769 remained in
full force, William Woodward had validly been removed as secretary
and treasurer and must return the College property and records, and
the formation and subsequent actions of the University Trustees were
void or voidable at the instance of the College Trustees. 318
The arguments at Haverhill were inconclusive. 319 The superior
court had only a week to devote to all of the matters before it, and
neither party was fully satisfied with the arguments presented. 320 Thus,
at the request of the parties, the court continued the case to be reargued
in full at its September term, to be held in Exeter, New Hampshire. 321
B. Exeter—The Arguments Before the New Hampshire Superior Court
of Judicature
1. The Setting
The Dartmouth College case was reargued before the Superior
Court over two full days commencing on September 19, 1817, before a
packed crowd of lawyers, clergymen, and a sprinkling of College
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

STITES, supra note 107, at 41; FARRAR, supra note 243, at 1–28.
FARRAR, supra note 243, at 27–28.
Id.
STITES, supra note 107, at 45.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 45.
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Trustees and faculty. 322 The central actors at Exeter—the advocates
and justices—were of exceptionally high quality, as were the arguments
made and the opinion of the court rendered some weeks later. Not
physically present at Exeter, but looming over the proceedings, were
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, to whom an appeal of the
anticipated opinion in favor of William Woodward and the University
seemed likely. And among those ultimate deciders, John Marshall and
Joseph Story were casting the largest shadows. Casting an equally
large shadow was the Supreme Court’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck. 323
2. Woodward’s Advocates
George Sullivan, the state’s attorney general, and Ichabod
Bartlett had represented Woodward at Haverhill and would do so again
at Exeter. Both were part of the new Dartmouth University governance
structure as overseer and trustee, respectively, and both were fine
lawyers, who would represent Woodward and the University’s interests
well. 324 However, as their contribution to the ultimate U.S. Supreme
Court decision ends at Exeter, I will not dwell on their biographies. In
contrast, the College lawyers deserve greater attention.
3. The College Advocates
Jeremiah Mason and Jeremiah Smith had represented the
College at Haverhill. At Exeter, they were joined by Daniel Webster. 325
This was a legal team of unparalleled experience and skill. 326 Mason
was renowned throughout New England for his legal knowledge and
craftmanship. 327 Smith was equally renowned for his legal acumen and
had been able to hone his mastery of legal theory during his eight years

322. Id. at 46.
323. See supra Part I.D.2.
324. STITES, supra note 107, at 44, 49–51, 60; TURNER, supra note 167, at 298; MASON, supra
note 269, at 165.
325. STITES, supra note 107, at 44–46.
326. PLUMER, supra note 222, at 178–79.
327. ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 90 (1997):
“If there be in the country a stronger intellect,” asserted the admiring [Daniel] Webster,
“if there be a mind of more native resources, if there be a vision that that sees quicker
or sees deeper into whatever is intricate, or whatever is profound, I must confess I have
not known it.”
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as an appellate jurist. 328 However, Mason and Smith shared one
weakness—they were only average orators. 329
Daniel Webster was the perfect addition to the team. Unlike
Mason and Smith, Webster had neither exceptional intellect, nor legal
knowledge, nor interest in legal theory. What Webster uniquely brought
to the table were legendary oratorical skills. The tributes to Webster’s
speaking skills, without more, could fill a book, but the following
description captures his gifts:
When he began to speak, his voice was low, his massive head sunk upon his chest, eyes
fixed upon the floor . . . . Soon the voice swelled and filled the room, his head now erect,
his eyes “black as death.” The voice, ah, “no lion in Africa ever had a voice like
him. . . . They all said—lawyers and judges and people—that they never heard such a
speech, or anything like it. They said that he talked like a different creature from any of
the rest of them, great or small—and there were men there that were not small.” As he
spoke, “[h]is whole countenance was radiant with emotion.” And the listening audience
sat transfixed. 330

Mason and Smith would provide the powerful and carefully
crafted legal arguments for the College, at Exeter and later at the U.S.
Supreme Court, while Webster would bring those arguments to life with
his unique ability to understand and capture his audience. But the trio
shared political alliances and friendships that would also be of great
importance going forward. Smith, Mason, and Webster were at the
pinnacle of Federalist Party leadership in New England. 331 Specific to
the battle to come after Exeter, Smith was greatly admired by John
Marshall, and Mason and Webster were friends of, and greatly admired
by, Joseph Story. 332 The trio’s political skills, friendships, and
connections would complement their legal and oratorical skills to the
very end of the litigation.
4. The Superior Court of Judicature and Chief Justice Richardson
The quality of the Superior Court of Judicature’s three justices
was a testament to Governor Plumer’s character, courage, and political
skill. Influential Democratic-Republicans had wanted the three posts,
and Plumer, instead, chose individuals with little political clout but
328. MASON, supra note 269, at 165 n.a (“[Daniel] Webster said of him: ‘He knows everything
about New England, and as to law he knows so much more of it than I do, or ever shall, that I
forbear to speak on that point.’ ” (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to James Kent, C., New York
Ct. of Chancery (1825))).
329. Id.
330. REMINI, supra note 327, at 79–80.
331. STITES, supra note 107, at 18.
332. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 151–52; MASON, supra note 269, at xi; REMINI, supra note
327, at 162.
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appropriate skill and character. 333 As Jeremiah Mason noted, “three
more men so well qualified as the present judges, and who would accept
the office, could not be found in the State.” 334
The associate justices, Samuel Bell and Levi Richardson,
brought complementary skills and knowledge to the bench, but as their
contributions end at Exeter, we will not dwell on their fascinating
biographies. 335 The central actor, whose opinion would be appealed to
the Supreme Court and frame the arguments for the University
interests in that forum, was Chief Justice William Richardson.
Richardson had lived in Massachusetts since matriculating to
Harvard College and had served that state in Congress for three years
before resigning and returning to his native New Hampshire in 1814 to
serve as the Portsmouth-based U.S. Attorney. Plumer appointed
Richardson despite intense objection that he lacked sufficient residence
in the state. Richardson was to serve with great distinction as chief
justice of the Superior Court of Judicature until his death in 1838. 336
5. The Nature of the Arguments Presented
The College advocates thought they had a fighting chance to
prevail in the New Hampshire litigation. However, their best instincts
told them that party would determine the outcome, and that the goal
must be to proceed on the assumption that an appeal to the
Supreme Court would be required to vindicate the Dartmouth
College Trustees. 337
With that likely prospect in mind, Mason, Smith, and Webster’s
strategy at Exeter had two prongs—first, make the strongest case
possible under the New Hampshire Constitution and common law
principles, and second, establish that the Charter of 1769 gave the
trustees vested contract rights protected by the Contract Clause of the

333. TURNER, supra note 167, at 267–69.
334. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Bell had previously served as New Hampshire’s governor for four years and as a U.S.
Senator for three terms; he was “a man of immense erudition and great business capacity, a
thorough lawyer, and possessed of great moral courage.” SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 149.
Woodbury, a great believer in state’s rights, would go on to serve New Hampshire as Governor and
U.S. Senator, and the nation as Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Treasury, and from 1845
until his death in 1851, as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 149–50; Paul Finkelman, Levi
Woodbury, in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 615 (Melvin Urofsky ed.,
2006).
336. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 149.
337. STITES, supra note 107, at 45 (Webster, in a letter to Jeremiah Mason, June 28, 1817,
wrote that it “would be a queer thing if Gov. P’s Court should refuse to execute his laws”).
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U.S. Constitution under the rationale John Marshall had set out in
Fletcher v. Peck. 338
Mason and Smith argued on September 19, with the former
speaking for two hours and the latter for four. Both sought to paint this
as a critical juncture in the effort begun with the Constitutional
Convention to protect private property against the tyranny of
unconstrained state legislative authority and majority rule, and thus
another struggle between Marshall and like-minded jurists, on one
hand, and Jeffersonians on the other. 339 On the twentieth, Daniel
Webster spoke for an hour, presenting closing arguments for the
College Trustees. It does not appear that Webster did more than
reinforce the points made by Mason and Smith. 340
Also on the twentieth, Sullivan and Bartlett presented the
defense of the Charter-Amendment Act. Speaking for only three hours,
they challenged each of the plaintiff’s points, and made Jeffersonian
arguments for why both the state of New Hampshire and the American
republic deserved and would be better served by a decision in
defendant’s favor. 341 The best of those arguments are reflected in the
opinion that the Superior Court of Judicature would soon render.
C. The Richardson Opinion
The Exeter arguments provided the New Hampshire Superior
Court justices with a comprehensive account of legal precedents and
theories to consider. The justices took their time in doing so, and
tensions rose for both sets of litigants during the interlude. Finally, on
November 6, 1817, Justice Richardson delivered the court’s unanimous
decision in favor of Woodward and the Charter-Amendment Act. 342
Richardson’s opinion 343 was a masterpiece. 344 Because he was
writing for the highest court in the state, he did not have to worry that
his interpretation of New Hampshire’s constitution would be overruled,
but he did understand that the College Trustees would likely appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court on Contract Clause grounds and would rely
338. Id. at 40. See generally FARRAR, supra note 243, at 28–69, 104–60.
339. STITES, supra note 107, at 46–49.
340. Id. at 51; FARRAR, supra note 243, at 206 (describing how the unofficial reporter tactfully
noted: “Mr. Webster closed the argument by a reply on the part of the plaintiffs; but as his views
of the case are more fully disclosed in his argument before the Supreme Court of the United States,
it is here omitted”).
341. STITES, supra note 107, at 49–51.
342. Id. at 52.
343. FARRAR, supra note 243, at 206–35.
344. See Daniel Webster’s comment, infra, at text accompanying note 365.
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heavily on Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, in which
Joseph Story had represented the prevailing party. Richardson was a
close friend of Joseph Story, and he believed Story would support the
constitutionality of the Charter-Amendment Act. 345 Richardson thus
crafted his opinion with Marshall in mind, hoping to gain his support
by showing that a proper and respectful understanding and application
of Marshall’s broader jurisprudence in fact compelled a decision
supporting the constitutionality of the Charter-Amendment statute.
Richardson began by asserting the centrality of what today we
might call a question of corporate theory: “In order to determine the
question submitted to us, it seems necessary in the first place to
ascertain the nature of corporations.” 346 To make that determination,
Richardson cited Marshall’s analysis in Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 347 decided in 1809, a case none of the attorneys for either side
had referenced in the arguments at Exeter. 348
In Deveaux, faced with the issue of whether for federal diversity
jurisdiction purposes the Bank of the United States could be considered
a citizen of Pennsylvania, the residence of its stockholders, Marshall
opined that as an “invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere
legal entity, a corporation aggregate, [the Bank] is certainly not a
citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the
United States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be
exercised in their corporate name.” 349 And, indeed, Marshall held that
the Bank’s members did have a right to sue in their corporate name and
to attribute to the corporation their citizenship. 350 In effect, Marshall
held that the corporate entity is but a set of legal faculties to be utilized
by natural persons. The corporation itself has no interests, purposes, or
ends; it is only a means to an end utilized by the incorporated natural
persons. 351
Accordingly, Richardson noted:
In deciding a case like this, where the complaint is that corporate rights have been
unconstitutionally infringed, it is the duty of the court to strip off the forms and fictions
with which the policy of the law has clothed those rights, and look beyond that intangible
creature of the law, the corporation which in form possesses them, to the individuals and
to the publick, to whom in reality, they belong, and who alone can be injured by a violation

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 239.
FARRAR, supra note 243, at 210.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
See FARRAR, supra note 243, at 28–206.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86.
Id. at 91–92.
FARRAR, supra note 243, at 211.
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of them. This action, therefore, though in form the complaint of the corporation, must be
considered as in substance the complaint of the trustees themselves. 352

Building further on Deveaux, Richardson reasoned:
[A] corporation may be considered as a body of individuals having collectively particular
faculties and capacities which they can employ for their own benefit, or for the benefit of
others, according to the purposes for which their particular faculties and capacities were
bestowed. In either view it is apparent, that all beneficial interests both in the franchises
and the property of corporations, must be considered as vested in natural persons, either
in the people at large, or in individuals; and that with respect to this interest, corporations
may be divided into publick and private. 353

Since the defining characteristics of a corporation are the
purposes and intended beneficiaries for which a corporation is created,
then the determination of whether a particular corporation is public or
private does not depend on who founded or provided initial funding or
property. 354
This was a power move by Richardson. The contours of the
evolving American understanding of the public and private realms were
developing obliquely in cases like Fletcher v. Peck and Terrett v. Taylor.
Here was a boldly transparent answer to the question of how the public
and private realms should be understood in relation to the
corporation. 355
Richardson then applied his framework to explain the nature of,
and realm occupied by, the private corporation. If individuals were
incorporated for commercial purposes—to do business as a bank,
manufacturing company, or turnpike operator, for instance—the
corporation would be private if the profits were intended to benefit the
incorporated persons and their assigns, even if all of the funds for the
intended endeavor were initially provided by the legislature. 356
Conversely, if the State should incorporate a commercial venture
reserving to itself the profits, such would be a public corporation even
if the necessary funds were provided via gifts from private
individuals. 357 And if the State should purchase stock in a private
business corporation, such a corporation would remain a private one, so
far as the stockholders’ rights are concerned, so long as even one share
of stock remained in private hands. 358

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 210–11.
See id. at 213.
See NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 129–36.
FARRAR, supra note 243, at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 211–13.
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Though dicta, Richardson’s follow-on assertion was clearly
aimed at forestalling any claims that upholding the CharterAmendment Act would threaten private property:
It [is] unnecessary to decide in this case, how far the legislature possesses a constitutional
right to interfere in the concerns of private corporations. It may not however, be improper
to remark, that it would be difficult to find a satisfactory reason why the property and
immunities of such corporations should not stand, in this respect on the same ground with
the property and immunities of individuals. 359

Applying then the same framing lens to the Trustees of Dartmouth
College, Richardson found the Charter of 1769 to unambiguously create
a public corporation:
It was created for the purpose of holding and managing property for the use of the college;
and the college was founded for the purpose of “spreading [Christianity] among the
[Indians] and of furnishing “the best means of education” to the province of NewHampshire. These great purposes are surely, if any thing can be, matters of publick
concern. Who has any private interest either in the objects or the property of this
institution? The trustees themselves have no greater interest in the spreading of
[C]hristian knowledge among the Indians, and in providing the best means of education,
than any other individuals in the community. Nor have they any private interest in the
property of this institution,—nothing that can be sold or transferred, that can descend to
their heirs, or can be assets in the hands of their administrators. If all the property of the
institution were destroyed, the loss would be exclusively publick, and no private loss to
them. 360

Having found that the Trustees of Dartmouth College, though
empowered to act as a body politic, were and must be treated as in
reality a group of natural persons, questions remained. How are we to
understand the nature of the corporate rights and privileges that the
charter has bestowed? Are they contractually created rights akin to the
real property at issue in Fletcher v. Peck? Did the Charter of 1769
convey vested property rights of the kind the Contract Clause was
intended to protect?
Richardson concluded that the answer to these questions was
“no.” Under the contract made by the sovereign, King George III, in
whose place the New Hampshire legislature now stood, the trustees
were in fact public officers, akin to judges, and sheriffs, and other public
officials, who while in office are subject to the will of the public at large,
for whose benefit they hold office and exercise corporate powers and
privileges. 361 So viewed, each trustee and the trustees collectively
served at the pleasure of the legislature. They had no right to complain
if the legislature increased the number of trustees, remodeled the
corporation’s charter and governance structure, or abolished the
359. Id. at 215–16.
360. Id. at 214–15
361. Id. at 215, 229–30.
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charter altogether, any more than a jurist might complain should the
legislature increase the number of members of the Superior Court or
decide to abolish the court altogether. So viewed, whatever contractual
rights the trustees had, they did not relate to private property and
obligations protected by the Contract Clause: 362
This clause, in the [C]onstitution of the United States, was obviously intended to protect
private rights of property, and embraces all contracts relating to private property,
whether executed or executory, and whether between individuals, between states, or
between states and individuals. . . . But this clause was not intended to limit the power of
the states, in relation to their own publick officers and servants, or to their own civil
institutions, and must not be construed to embrace contracts, which are in their nature,
mere matters of civil institution; nor grants of power and authority, by a state to
individuals, to be exercised for purposes merely publick. 363

IV. THE END GAME—THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. On to Washington
Richardson’s opinion was of great concern to College supporters.
They had anticipated losing at the state level, but they had not
anticipated such a strong opinion. 364 As Daniel Webster later admitted,
“[t]he truth is, the New Hampshire opinion is able, ingenious, and
plausible.” 365 And, as the College faction prepared to take a writ of error
to the U.S. Supreme Court, more bad news arrived; credible sources
indicated that Justice Joseph Story would be against them at the
Supreme Court. 366
It had been known that Story counted among his close friends
both the recently deceased John Wheelock and Chief Justice
Richardson, and that he was a close confidant of Governor Plumer, who
had named Story an initial member of the Dartmouth University Board
of Overseers, a position Story had declined. 367 Moreover, it now came to
light that Story had consulted with Governor Plumer during the
legislature’s consideration of the Charter-Amendment Act, had given
the Governor his approval of the Act, and had now indicated that he
agreed with Richardson’s opinion. 368

362. Id. at 216–18, 225–30.
363. Id. at 229.
364. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 166–67.
365. Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, J., Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Sept. 9, 1818), in 17
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 287 (Fletcher Webster ed., 1903).
366. See STITES, supra note 107, at 73; 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 139–42.
367. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 139, 143; SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 239.
368. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 143; DUNNE, supra note 59, at 167.

1704

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1625

As this word leaked out, supporters of the College at other
colleges and universities, including Harvard’s president, began to doubt
the wisdom of carrying the case to the Supreme Court. As one College
supporter reported to President Brown,
[s]ome of my friends here who sincerely wish success to the cause of your College, have
yet a strong wish that it should not be carried to Washington, from an apprehension that,
even should the [Supreme] Court take up the cause at large and consider it in all its
points, there would be an influence among them which would probably confirm the
present decision and thereby increase an hundred fold the weight of its authority. 369

Meanwhile, University supporters quickly had Richardson’s opinion
published and widely circulated. 370
From this point forward ex parte communications between the
litigants and Supreme Court Justices became the rule instead of the
exception, and it is tempting to conclude that the process which led to
the Court’s ultimate decision was far more political in nature than
judicial, as we now understand those processes. As one chronicle puts
it:
[T]he essential facts of the case were as well understood by the leading minds in New
England two years before as two years after the decision; and so of the general grounds
taken by both sides. The question was an interesting and important one, constantly
mooted in all legal, religious, and political circles. 371

As part of the lobbying and influence campaign, Webster
persuaded the College Trustees to authorize the filing of three federal
diversity actions whereby residents of Vermont asserted claims that
would allow the federal courts to essentially relitigate the case that was
already headed to the Supreme Court on appeal. 372 To facilitate this
strategy, the College leased all of the land on which the College
buildings and chapel lay to friends residing in Vermont and then filed
writs in ejectment interpleading the University Trustees to defend the
title to the College properties. 373 Webster, Smith, and Mason believed
that other arguments made at Exeter—those founded on the English
common law of corporations, the sanctity of vested property rights, and
the limits on legislative authority inherent in the American system of
government—were stronger than, but also complemented, the Contract
Clause basis which the Woodward case presented to the Supreme
Court. More importantly, though, these cases would be filed in Joseph
369. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
370. STITES, supra note 107, at 58.
371. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 239.
372. NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 131.
373. These were collusive suits similar to the collusive suit filed in Fletcher v. Peck, to which
Joseph Story had been a party as council for Peck. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 1–7. Likewise, Story
was aware of these collusive suits and eager to assist in having them forwarded to the Supreme
Court. NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 131.
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Story’s circuit court in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and would give
Webster, Mason, and Smith significant excuses for conducting ex parte
communications with Story, both before and after the arguments at
Washington. 374
The College side decided early on that Webster would take the
lead in preparing and conducting the appeal, but the message he would
deliver would be principally based on the analysis and arguments that
Smith and Mason had presented at Exeter. Webster carefully absorbed
Smith and Mason’s briefing materials in the months leading up to the
Washington arguments and met with Mason on at least one occasion to
fine-tune his preparation. 375
To join Webster in Washington, the College forces decided on
Joseph Hopkinson, a capable lawyer then serving the state of
Pennsylvania in the U.S. House of Representatives. 376 Webster thought
it important that he not appear alone, but rather in association with
“some distinguished counsel.” 377 Hopkinson was a highly regarded
litigator, providing Webster with a teammate of appropriate
reputation. 378 Moreover, corralling the competent Hopkinson prevented
the University forces from retaining him as Webster suspected they
otherwise might. 379 However, Hopkinson was not being retained to
carry a heavy load in the coming proceedings. There was no advocate in
America with greater experience or skill in arguing before the Supreme
Court than Webster. All that was asked or needed from second fiddle
Hopkinson was adequate preparation for the limited role he would
be assigned. 380
In contrast to the well-oiled machine that the College advocates,
led by Webster, Mason, and Smith, had become, the University
preparations were a disaster. Bartlett and Sullivan had performed
exceedingly well at Exeter, but the University side chose to retain new
374. Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason (Apr. 28, 1818), in 17 THE WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 365, at 282–83:
The question which we must raise in one of these actions, is, “whether, by the general
principles of our governments, the State Legislatures be not restrained from divesting
vested rights?” . . . On this question I have great confidence in a decision on the right
side. This is the proposition with which you began your argument at Exeter, and which
I endeavored to state from your minutes at Washington.
375. STITES, supra note 107, at 56–57.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 56.
378. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 138–39.
379. STITES, supra note 107, at 57.
380. See id. (explaining how Webster, who was principally responsible for preparing the
appeal, initiated employment with Hopkinson for his legal ability and to prevent him from being
retained by the University).
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counsel for the Washington arguments. They first selected John
Holmes, a lawyer by trade, but by inclination and attributes best suited
for the role of politician. 381 Holmes was then representing Maine in the
U.S. House of Representatives, and the fact that Holmes would not
require reimbursement of travel expenses unfortunately played a major
role in his retention. 382 Almost immediately, friends of the University
voiced concerns that Holmes would not be up to the task of leading the
University efforts before the Supreme Court. 383 Perhaps Plumer and
others had not realized how poorly regarded Holmes was as lawyer. If
so, they soon did. As one writer put it, “[w]ere you sensible . . . of the
low ebb of Holmes’s reputation here, you should I think hesitate to trust
the cause with him.” 384
To compensate for the weakness of their first choice, University
forces turned to William Wirt, the recognized leader of the Virginia bar
and an advocate of great skill and reputation. In testament to his
stature, Wirt had recently been appointed Attorney General of the
United States, making him, on paper, an appropriate foil for Daniel
Webster. Moreover, Webster had firsthand knowledge of Wirt in action
and considered him a more than worthy opponent. 385
As the University forces had come to fear, Holmes was ill-suited
for the task at hand. He made matters worse by devoting little time to
preparation. 386 However, Wirt turned out to be a bad choice as well.
Wirt was overwhelmed by the backlog of pending cases and briefs that
needed writing in his recently assumed role as attorney general. 387
Thus, when the arguments began at Washington, neither Holmes nor
Wirt knew critical basic facts about the Dartmouth College case, and
neither had prepared or carefully rehearsed the legal arguments they
would make. 388
B. The Supreme Court Arguments
1. The Proceedings on March 10–12, 1818
On the morning of March 10, Daniel Webster commenced his
famous argument before the Supreme Court that was to end five hours
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
See id. at 59–60.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 59, 66–67
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later. 389 As universally recorded, Webster’s performance was one of his
best and totally transfixed the Justices, but the substance of Webster’s
remarks was mostly the work of Jeremiah Smith and Jeremiah Mason,
as will be explained in the next subpart.
John Holmes had the unenviable task of following Webster.
Taking the lead for the University side on the afternoon of the tenth,
Holmes spoke for three hours. 390 His performance was every bit as bad
as the University supporters feared—high in emotion and rhetorical
flourishes, low to lacking in substance. 391
The following day, William Wirt began his presentation. 392 Early
on, he argued the significance of Eleazar Wheelock not being the
founder of the College corporation. When confronted with the fact that
the College charter expressly identified Eleazar as the founder, the
flustered and ill-prepared Wirt had what was described by on-lookers
as a breakdown. 393 The Court granted Wirt’s request to return the next
day to resume his arguments. 394
On March 12, Wirt completed his arguments in creditable
fashion, having spent the previous afternoon and evening regaining his
composure and plugging holes in his deficient preparation. But, like
Holmes, he added nothing to the Court’s understanding of the case
beyond what they could glean from Richardson’s excellent and
persuasive opinion. 395
Joseph Hopkinson then closed the proceedings, speaking for an
hour and a half. Hopkinson’s closing remarks broke no new ground. As
he would later write to President Brown, Webster’s argument on the
tenth left Hopkinson with “little to do but to follow his steps and repeat
his blows.” 396 In every real sense, Webster’s performance on March 10
was both the opening and closing argument for the College.
2. The Source of Webster’s Substantive Arguments
To understand what we know about the substance of Webster’s
arguments on the morning of March 10 requires the acknowledgment
of another central actor—Timothy Farrar, Jr., who we have briefly
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 239.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 236.
2 LORD, supra note 141, at 149.
SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 235–36.
See supra Part III.C (detailing Richardson’s opinion).
STITES, supra note 107, at 68.
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noted before in his role as key advisor to President Brown. 397 Farrar,
Jr., compiled the only account of the Exeter proceedings as well as an
unofficial account of the Supreme Court arguments. The portion of his
report (the “Farrar Report”) that records the arguments made at
Washington was then similarly memorialized as Wheaton’s Report, now
the official U.S. Supreme Court record of the arguments and opinions
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 398
Farrar compiled the Farrar Report with the assistance of the
advocates, supplementing his own notes with materials they supplied,
including their briefing papers. 399 However, this was not a totally
objective, disinterested, or independent exercise on Farrar’s part. To
begin with, Farrar was both a staunch Federalist and a staunch
supporter of the College Trustees’ cause. Moreover, Farrar, who had
been Daniel Webster’s law partner in 1813, compiled his Report with
the active assistance of Webster and made editing choices to present
the College Trustees’ attorneys in the best possible light. 400
If one relied only on Wheaton’s official report, or the portion of
the Farrar Report that Wheaton’s mirrors, one would have the very
mistaken impression that the arguments attributed to Daniel Webster
in those reports are the entirety of the case he presented at Washington.
That would be far from accurate. We are told that at Exeter, Jeremiah
Mason and Jeremiah Smith argued on September 19, 1817, with the
former speaking for two hours and the latter for four. 401 Yet the
arguments attributed to them cover forty-three and fifty-eight pages,
respectively, in the Farrar Report, which would hardly reflect such a
division of time. The next day, we are told, Sullivan and Bartlett
presented the defense of the Charter-Amendment Act, speaking for only
three hours. Yet the Farrar Report devotes eighty pages to recording

397. See supra notes 296–297 and accompanying text.
398. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). It is unclear the exact process whereby Wheaton ended up
with the near identical report of the arguments at Washington as are contained in the Farrar
Report, but we can see the agency of both Daniel Webster and Justice Story coordinating the
compilation of both reports, and it is clear that Wheaton’s own notes were sparse, and that his
report depended on and was derivative of the Farrar Report, which was compiled first, and then
provided to Wheaton. See SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 292–98 (describing the making of the
reports). For one of the few differences between Farrar and Wheaton, see 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 246–47 (1919) (citing FARRAR, supra note 243, at 280), regarding
Webster’s claim that it is well established that a state cannot revoke a charter. This argument is
omitted from Wheaton’s report. Id. at 247 n.4. On Story’s collaboration with Henry Wheaton, see
Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1291, 1312–51 (1985).
399. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 174–75.
400. See id. at 175 (quoting a letter from Webster recommending that objectionable material
be edited out); 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 168 (discussing Webster’s involvement).
401. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 174.
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their arguments. 402 It is unlikely that Mason and Smith spent six hours
delivering arguments that reduce to ninety-one pages, while Sullivan
and Bartlett could in three hours cover nearly the same amount
of material.
As to Daniel Webster, we are told that at Exeter, he spoke for
less than two hours in presenting closing arguments for the College
Trustees. 403 Of that closing argument, the Farrar Report states: “Mr.
Webster closed the argument by a reply on the part of the plaintiffs; but
as his views of the case are more fully disclosed in his argument before
the Supreme Court of the United States, it is here omitted.” 404 In his
later argument before the U.S. Supreme Court we are told that Webster
spoke for nearly five hours, yet the Farrar Report dedicates only fortysix pages to recording Webster’s remarks, and the Wheaton Report is of
similar length. 405 Assuming the time Webster spent before the U.S.
Supreme Court should bear a similar relationship to the pages needed
to record his argument as the total time spent by Mason, Smith,
Bartlett, and Sullivan at Exeter bore to the pages devoted to recording
their arguments, there should be at least fifty more pages devoted to
Webster’s remarks at Washington.
What is missing from the two reports of Webster’s remarks to
the Supreme Court is his delivery of the arguments made by Sullivan
and Mason at Exeter.
As one of John Marshall’s most comprehensive biographers
noted, “Webster’s address [to the Supreme Court] was a combination of
the arguments made by Mason and Smith in the New Hampshire
court.” 406
This fact was expressly acknowledged by Webster in his April
23, 1818, letter to Mason:
As to the college cause, I cannot argue it anymore, I believe. I have told you very often
that you and Judge Smith argued it very greatly. If it was well argued at Washington, it
is a proof that I was right, because all that I said at Washington was but those two
arguments, clumsily put together by me. 407

And, in a letter to Mason dated April 10, 1818, Webster
expressly acknowledged that the Farrar Report would set out the bulk
402. FARRAR, supra note 243, at 70–104, 161–206.
403. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 174.
404. FARRAR, supra note 243, at 206.
405. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 237; FARRAR, supra note 243, at 238–84; Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 551–600 (1819).
406. 4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 398, at 240.
407. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 211 (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason
(Apr. 23, 1818)).
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of the arguments he had made at Washington that were attributable to
Smith and Mason:
My own interest will be promoted by preventing the book [Farrar’s Report] . . . . [I]f the
“book” should not be published, the world would not know where I borrowed my plumes.
But I am still inclined to have the book. One reason is that you & Judge Smith may have
the credit which belongs to you. 408

Thus, the best approximation of the substance of Webster’s
Supreme Court oration is found by treating the Farrar Report’s account
of Smith’s and Mason’s remarks at Exeter as the portion of Webster’s
actual remarks at Washington that were not reported as such by either
Farrar or Wheaton. As we shall see, Webster would make sure that the
Supreme Court Justices received printed copies of the substance of
Smith’s and Mason’s arguments before rendering their decision in
the case.
C. From the Supreme Court Argument to the Decision
On the morning of March 13, 1818, the Court reconvened, and
Marshall announced where the case stood: “Some of the judges have not
come to an opinion on the case. Those of the judges who have formed
opinions do not agree. The cause must therefore be continued until the
next term.” 409
This development caused both sides pause. The decision was
obviously up for grabs. Webster thought that Marshall and ultimately
Story would be on the College’s side, two others probably against, and
the other three Justices impossible to predict. 410 The University side
was more optimistic, thinking that at least six of the Justices would rule
in their favor. 411 Both sides would now engage in activities that today
would seem to us more like lobbying than lawyering.
For the College side, the three new federal writs in ejectment
were finally filed in Joseph Story’s Circuit Court later in March, and
Webster met with Story who promised to enter a special verdict and
take whatever steps necessary to hurry them on to Washington in time
for the Supreme Court’s 1819 term. 412 At the same time, Webster was
having the substance of his Supreme Court argument printed (the
“Webster pamphlet” or “his pamphlet”), including Mason and Smith’s

408. Id. (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason (Apr. 10, 1818)) (first
alteration in original).
409. Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. STITES, supra note 107, at 69.
411. Id.; see also SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 238–39.
412. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 173.
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contributions, and he discreetly distributed a few copies to persons of
political influence.
Several college presidents attended the arguments at
Washington, and the opinion among academic institutions swung
heavily in favor of Dartmouth College as the party that should prevail.
In May, a Council of Colleges was formed, composed of Dartmouth and
seven other New England institutions of higher education. President
Brown was invited as the representative of Dartmouth College;
President Allen of Dartmouth University was excluded. 413
In early July 1818, however, the University faction scored a coup
in the ongoing battle to influence the Court in Washington. James Kent,
the chancellor of New York’s Court of Chancery and one of the country’s
most respected jurists, visited with University supporters on a trip to
New Hampshire. While there, Kent read Richardson’s opinion and
pronounced that he was in full agreement. Webster took this
development particularly hard, knowing that Supreme Court Justices
Johnson and Livingston were admirers of Kent, and that they and
perhaps other Justices as well as the court of public opinion would give
great weight to the Chancellor’s view, particularly given Kent’s strong
identification with the Federalist Party. 414 To close associates, Daniel
Webster confided that there was now scant hope of success. 415
Nonetheless, Webster and the College forces pressed on. College
supporter Charles Marsh sent Chancellor Kent a copy of Webster’s
pamphlet, and President Brown made a subsequent trip to visit with
the Chancellor. 416 These efforts proved successful. In a letter of August
26, 1818, Kent replied to Marsh, thanking him for the chance to read
the pamphlet and recanting his earlier opinion:
But I will declare to you with equal frankness that the fuller statement of facts in Mr.
W.’s argument in respect to the original & reasons & substance of the charter of 1769 and
the sources of the gifts, gives a new complexion to the case and it is very probable that if I
was now to sit down and seriously study the case with the facts at large before me that I
should be led to a different conclusion from the one I had at first formed. 417

This information was a tremendous boost to College spirits, as
President Brown had learned during his visit with Kent that Supreme
Court Justice Johnson had formally asked for the Chancellor’s opinion

413. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 1–7; NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 131.
414. SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 253, 255.
415. Id. at 250.
416. Id. at 253.
417. Id. at 262–63 (quoting Letter from James Kent, C., New York Ct. of Chancery, to Charles
Marsh, Tr., Dartmouth Coll. (Aug. 26, 1818)).

1712

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1625

on the case and indicated that Justice Livingston was interested
as well. 418
Webster also became more aggressive in the distribution of
his pamphlet in the aftermath of Chancellor Kent’s visit to
New Hampshire:
I send [ ] with great cheerfulness a “sketch” of our view of the question about D.
College. . . . If you should think there is any merit in the manner of this argument you
must recollect that it is drawn from materials furnished by Judge Smith & Mr. Mason, as
well as from the little contributed by myself. The opinion of the [New Hampshire] Court
had been a good deal circulated, and I was urged to exhibit in print our view of the case.
A few copies only were printed, and those have been used rather cautiously. A respect for
the court, as well as general decorum, seem to prohibit the publishing of an argument
while the cause is pending. I have no objection to your showing this to any professional
friend in your discretion, I only wish to guard against its becoming too publick. 419

And he was in active correspondence with Justice Story, to
whom he wrote on August 16: “According to your wish, I send you a copy
of such memoranda of cases, [etc.], as I have met with, relative to the
college question.” 420
And on September 9, Webster sent five copies of his pamphlet to
Justice Story:
I send you five copies of our argument. If you send one of them to each of the judges as
you think proper, you will of course do it in the manner least likely to lead to a feeling
that any indecorum has been committed by the plaintiffs. . . . [Richardson’s opinion] has
been widely circulated, and something was necessary to exhibit the other side of the
question. 421

The lobbying continued as both sides waited for the 1819 term
of the Supreme Court, but the die had been cast. On February 2, 1819,
Webster arrived at the Supreme Court still uncertain of how Justices
Story, Washington, and Livingston would rule and whether the Court
would grant the University forces a rehearing of the matter to introduce
new evidence. Chief Justice Marshall quickly ended that uncertainty.
As soon as he took the bench, ignoring newly retained University
counsel, Charles Pickney, who was poised to ask for reargument,
Marshall announced that the case had been decided in favor of the
College Trustees and then read his opinion. 422 Six days later, the
College supporters took control of all Dartmouth facilities as of right. 423
418. DUNNE, supra note 59, at 171–72.
419. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 152 (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Jacob McGaw
(July 27, 1818)).
420. Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, J., Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Aug. 16, 1818), in 17
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 365, at 286.
421. Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, J., Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Sept. 9, 1818), in 17
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 365, at 287.
422. STITES, supra note 107, at 78.
423. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 164–65.

2021]

WHAT WAS THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
CASE REALLY ABOUT?

1713

Disposition of the three pending ejectment suits and various minor
disputes remained to be settled, but in short order the Supreme Court’s
decision was accepted as the final word on the Dartmouth College
charter dispute in the minds—if not the hearts—of both sides in
the controversy. 424
D. The Supreme Court Opinions
From the beginning of his tenure, Chief Justice Marshall had
urged the Court to speak with one voice, and his fellow Justices had
usually complied. Concurring opinions had been rare, and dissents
rarer. 425 So, the Dartmouth College case is immediately notable because
there were two concurring opinions and a dissent. In addition to
Marshall’s majority opinion, Washington and Story wrote concurring
opinions. Justice Livingston concurred in all three opinions. Justice
Johnson concurred only with Marshall’s opinion. Justice Duvall, who
would only record two dissents during the entirety of his nearly twentythree years on the Court, dissented, but without an explanatory
opinion. Justice Todd, due to illness, took no part in the case. 426
1. The Contract Clause Issue
The only issue actually before the Court was a narrow one—was
the College Amendment Act an unconstitutional abridgement of the
contract rights of the Trustees of Dartmouth College? 427 On this narrow
issue the three opinions all agreed with the College position, as argued
at Exeter, New Hampshire, by Jeremiah Mason and Jeremiah Smith,
whose arguments had been provided to the Justices by Webster, both in
his formal argument to the Court on March 10, 1818, and via the
materials he circulated to them, using Joseph Story as the conduit. 428
Both Mason and Smith asserted, citing the English case of
Phillips v. Bury, that the central pillar of the Richardson opinion was
founded on a misunderstanding of the law of corporations. The grant of
incorporation to a private person creates private property, even

424. Id. at 162–76.
425. Herbert A. Johnson, John Marshall, in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 335, at 331–32.
426. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 666, 713 (1819); SHIRLEY,
supra note 107, at 202; John Paul Jones, Gabriel Duvall, in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 335, at 179.
427. FARRAR, supra note 243, at 235–36; SHIRLEY, supra note 107, at 208.
428. See supra Part IV.C.

1714

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1625

if the purpose of the corporation is to be a charitable or
eleemosynary undertaking. 429
Second, citing Fletcher v. Peck, they both argued that the
Charter of 1769 not only created private property rights and privileges,
but was also a contract of the type protected by the Contract Clause of
the Constitution. 430 As Mason put it,
The charter of 1769 is a contract, within the true meaning of that term, as used in the
[C]onstitution of the United States. Every grant, whether from a private individual, or
from a state, is a contract. A grant from a state being necessarily made, with great
deliberation and formality, constitutes a contract of the most solemn nature. It is of
familiar knowledge, that a grant from one individual to another, either of lands, or of
incorporeal rights, amounts in legal estimation to a contract. In like manner, a similar
grant, from a state to an individual, constitutes a contract. A state incurs the same
obligation from its grant, as a private individual does; and it has no more power to abolish
its grants, or discharge itself from their obligation, than a private individual has. No just
government can desire to possess such power. 431

Finally, both Exeter advocates asserted that the CharterAmendment Act impaired the contract rights of the College Trustees in
violation of the Contract Clause since it attempted to change in a
material way the provisions of the Charter of 1769 without the trustees’
consent. 432 As Smith succinctly noted on this point,
I confess it does seem strange to me, that any advocate should now be found, gravely to
contend, that the acts have made no essential change in the corporation as constituted by
the charter. They have changed the name, the number of members, the manner of their
appointment, and of maintaining a perpetual succession; have created a board of
overseers, chosen and to be perpetuated by the state, have divested the corporation of the
property given it by the founders and other donors—have altered the uses for which it
was given, and applied it to new uses and trusts[ ]—have appointed an officer for the
corporation and invested him with power to hold their property against their will. They
have made a new constitution for this seminary. 433

Marshall, Story, and Washington completely agreed with Mason and
Smith’s basic arguments. 434 The Charter of 1769 was a contract within
the meaning of the Contract Clause, and the New Hampshire
legislature had wrongfully impaired those rights.
As Justice Washington noted at the beginning of his opinion, the
Court had proper jurisdiction only to address the claimed violation of
the Contract Clause, and he limited his twelve-page opinion to a logical
and coherent application of the arguments made by Mason and Smith

429. FARRAR, supra note 243, at 38–42.
430. Id. at 54, 63–68, 156–60.
431. Id. at 64.
432. Id. at 29–32, 105–10.
433. Id. at 109.
434. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 643–47, 651–53, 655–
66, 700–02, 706–12 (1819).
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to explain why the College Amendment Act was unconstitutional. 435 In
contrast to Washington’s, Justice Story’s and Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinions spanned forty-seven and thirty pages, respectively. 436 For
Story and Marshall, much more was of interest than a narrow decision
of the limited issue before the Court.
2. Justice Story’s Opinion
a. Story’s Intellectual Passions
Joseph Story had an intense intellectual interest in, and love of,
the law. As a young lawyer, he had faced an American legal landscape
heavily dependent on English law and precedents and almost totally
devoid of American legal treatises. He devoured Blackstone’s
Commentaries, and he relied on what he learned as he served his
clients. His approach to both the practice of law and his treatise writing
was scientific. He would look first to English law and then determine
the extent to which it should be adopted or modified for application in
America. This process of transforming English precedents into a
derivative, but uniquely great American system of law
transfixed him. 437
Neither Story nor anyone else on the Court was a specialist in
corporation law. 438 Story had dealt with few corporate matters in
practice, and corporation matters were just beginning to multiply as
Story joined the Court. 439 Thus, the Dartmouth College case drew
Story’s interest because it gave him an opportunity to learn more about
the emerging American law of corporations. He used the bully pulpit of
his concurring opinion primarily in an attempt to influence that
emerging law.
b. Adopting and Transforming English Precedents
In his Exeter argument, Jeremiah Smith had explained the
English precedents concerning eleemosynary corporations and how
those precedents should be transformed for application in America. This
scientific remolding of British precedents to suit the evolving American
435. Id. at 654–66.
436. Id. at 666–713, 624–54.
437. NEWMYER, supra note 69, at 40–45. Even before joining the Court, Story had merged his
intellectual love of the law with his practical knowledge to write five treatises for practitioners on
a variety of subjects. Id. at 68–69.
438. Id. at 80.
439. Id. at 64–67.
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environment was exactly what Story had been doing most of his
professional life.
As Smith described, the typical English eleemosynary
corporation was funded by one or more persons. In contributing the
assets that the corporation would need to carry out its purposes, the
founder was merely changing what legal person owned the private
property donated. They were not changing the nature of property
ownership from private to public: 440
[B]y the incorporation, [they] acquire a new faculty, or power for the management, and
application of this property to the use designated by them. Their right, as individuals, to
the property thus dedicated would cease, and become vested in the same persons in their
new character. The effect of the incorporation would be, to unite several wills into one
will; and several persons into one artificial person, capable in law to hold, manage and
apply this fund. 441

When the typical English eleemosynary corporation was formed,
individuals for whom the bounty was created assumed the use of the
property, and the founder was presumed to retain a right of visitation.
In the setting of a college or university, the bounty would be used “to
maintain a certain number of instructers [sic] and students, and to
procure the buildings, books and accommodations necessary for the
purpose of education.” 442 The founder, either expressly, or by necessary
implication, would retain the power of visitation to make sure that the
funds were properly applied. 443
In America, however, this normal circumstance rarely occurred
due to the absence of large stores of accumulated wealth. Instead, it
became the common practice for the founder to designate himself and
other respected persons as the trustees of the eleemosynary
corporation, and in such case, whether by express provision or
implication, the trustees assumed the role of visitation, collectively
overseeing the use of the corporation’s property and bounty by the
intended beneficiaries. Instead of the bounty of one founder or a few
founders, the American use of the eleemosynary corporation usually
was a vehicle for the solicitation and acquisition of needed resources
over time and from many donors, which would occur after incorporation.
This, of course, is exactly what was done by Eleazar Wheelock. 444
With this understanding of English common law, the final step
was the recognition that the contract involved in the formation of the
corporation was twofold; the sovereign impliedly promised that it would
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

FARRAR, supra note 243, at 115–17.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117–20.
Id. at 120–26.
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recognize the rights of the artificial entity created to the same extent as
if the corporation’s properties were still held by natural persons, and
the incorporated persons promised to use their corporate privileges to
further the charitable purpose for which their charter had been
granted, subject to supervision by a court of law in the case of misuse. 445
Not surprisingly, Story adopted Smith’s description of English
common law and its application in America, along with Smith’s analysis
of Eleazar Wheelock’s role as founder and the reasons why corporate
form was essential to the accomplishment of Eleazar’s charitable
designs. Story’s version takes up the first twelve pages in his opinion. 446
c. The Business Corporation and the State
Story initially had agreed with the Richardson opinion. 447 Even
as he came to see its fatal flaw, it had stimulated his thinking about the
emerging use of corporations by private business interests and provided
him with a starting point for expressing his views.
To begin with, Story took Richardson’s opinion as the framework
for establishing not only the possibility of creating private
eleemosynary corporations, but also for claiming for private business
corporations the rights that Richardson had conceded: 448
Another division of corporations is into public and private. . . . [P]ublic corporations are
such only as are founded by the government, for public purposes, where the whole
interests belong also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though
under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the
uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and
objects of the institution. For instance, a bank created by the government for its own uses,
whose stock is exclusively owned by the government, is, in the strictest sense, a public
corporation. So, an hospital created and endowed by the government for general charity.
But a bank, whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private corporation, although it
is erected by the government, and its objects and operations partake of a public nature.
The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies.
In all these cases, the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations
are private; as much so, indeed, as if the franchises were vested in a single person. 449

Story’s next move was to assert that the corporation was a party
to the contract with the king. This was a tricky move because the
corporation did not come into existence until the charter was granted.
445. Id. at 156–57.
446. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 666–78 (1819).
447. See supra notes 366–368 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 355–359 and accompanying text (discussing Richardson’s view that a
corporation would be private if it was rich for commercial purposes and was intended to benefit
the incorporated persons; and, conversely, a corporation would be public if it was incorporated by
the state and profits were to be reserved for the state).
449. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 668–69.
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How could it be a party to that which had been entered into before
its existence?
From the nature of things, the artificial person called a corporation, must be created,
before it can be capable of taking anything. When, therefore, a charter is granted, and it
brings the corporation into existence, without any act of the natural persons who compose
it, and gives such corporation any privileges, franchises or property, the law deems the
corporation to be first brought into existence, and then clothes it with the granted liberties
and property. When, on the other hand, the corporation is to be brought into existence, by
some future acts of the corporators, the franchises remain in abeyance, until such acts are
done, and when the corporation is brought into life, the franchises instantaneously attach
to it. There may be, in intendment of law, a priority of time, even in an instant, for this
purpose. And if the corporation have an existence, before the grant of its other franchises
attaches, what more difficulty is there in deeming the grant of these franchises a contract
with it, than if granted by another instrument, at a subsequent period? 450

Establishing that the corporation was a party to the express
contract with the sovereign allowed Story to opine as to the nature of
implied provisions arising from the act of incorporation.
The crown, then, upon the face of the charter, pledged its faith that the donations of
private benefactors should be perpetually devoted to their original purposes, without any
interference on its own part, and should be for ever administered by the trustees of the
corporation, unless its corporate franchises should be taken away by due process of law.
From the very nature of the case, therefore, there was an implied contract on the part of
the crown, with every benefactor, that if he would give his money, it should be deemed a
charity protected by the charter, and be administered by the corporation, according to the
general law of the land. As, soon, then, as a donation was made to the corporation, there
was an implied contract, springing up, and founded on a valuable consideration, that the
crown would not revoke or alter the charter, or change its administration, without the
consent of the corporation. There was also an implied contract between the corporation
itself, and every benefactor, upon a like consideration, that it would administer his bounty
according to the terms, and for the objects stipulated in the charter. 451

This notion of a separate contract between the state and the
corporation, and between the corporation and its donors, combined with
Story’s unnecessary concession that a legislative reservation of a right
to amend a corporation’s charter would be constitutional, would in the
business corporation context become a central feature in the debate
over shareholders’ vested rights that would be contested until the
middle of the twentieth century. 452

450. Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
451. Id. at 689–90.
452. See, e.g., Morris v. Am. Pub. Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 700 (Del. Ch. 1923):
That a corporate charter is a contract has been long settled. . . . [I]t is spoken of as “a
dual contract—one between the state and the corporation and its stockholders, the
other between the corporation and its stockholders.” That there is a third aspect in
which the contract may be regarded would appear clear, for not only is there a
contractual tie binding in the two respects observed . . . but there is as well a
contractual relation in many particulars existing between the stockholders inter sese.
(citation omitted).
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d. Vested Rights in Judicial Office
Finally, Story took the occasion to opine on whether the
protections of the Contract Clause would extend so far as to make
unconstitutional the New Hampshire Federalists’ 1813 action, and
Democratic-Republicans’ 1816 retaliatory action, in removing jurists
with life-time tenure, not through a finding of misbehavior, but by the
simple mechanism of terminating the judicial offices held. 453 This had
been a festering sore between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans
since the 1802 repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1801. Jeremiah
Smith, Jeremiah Mason, and Chief Justice Richardson had all felt the
effects of these legislative actions, and so had Governor Plumer. The
Dartmouth controversy might never have occurred but for the political
fallout from this long-simmering political controversy:
It is admitted, that the state legislatures have power to enlarge, repeal and limit the
authorities of public officers, in their official capacities, in all cases, where the
constitutions of the states respectively do not prohibit them; and this, among others, for
the very reason, that there is no express or implied contract, that they shall always,
during their continuance in office, exercise such authorities; they are to exercise them
only during the good pleasure of the legislature. 454

With this concession, Story sought to assure state legislatures
that the Supreme Court would not use the Contract Clause to referee
party disputes internal to the states. 455
3. Chief Justice Marshall’s Opinion
For Chief Justice Marshall, Richardson’s opinion and its reliance
on Marshall’s analysis in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux caused
a rethink of his approach to the corporation and the applicability of
British precedents. 456 In Deveaux, Marshall had begun with the
seemingly obvious proposition: “That invisible, intangible, and artificial
453. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 693–94.
454. Id.
455. Story would have preferred straying even further from the issues directly before the
Court, to hold that the Charter-Amendment Act violated the fundamental principles underlying
the American system of government, as Jeremiah Mason had argued at Exeter. Story confided to
Mason subsequent to the decision in October 1819:
“I always had a desire that the question should be put on the broad basis you have
stated; and it was a matter of regret that we were so stinted in jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court, that half the argument could not be met and enforced. You need not
fear a comparison of your argument with any in our annals.”
4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 398, at 251.
456. See supra notes 347–354 and accompanying text (demonstrating how Richardson relied
and built on Marshall’s analysis in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux and Marshall’s broader
jurisprudence).
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being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a
citizen . . . .” 457 Whether a suit could be maintained in federal court
depended, then, on whether the corporation or its stockholders were the
real party in interest. As to that point, Marshall noted the primacy of
British precedents: “As our ideas of a corporation, its privileges and its
disabilities, are derived entirely from the English books, we resort to
them for aid, in ascertaining its character.” 458 Then, after solely
examining British precedents, Marshall concluded that the corporate
entity was not the real party at interest and effectively pierced the
corporate veil so that the Bank’s stockholders’ citizenship could be used
to satisfy the diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction:
If the corporation be considered as a mere faculty, and not as a company of individuals,
who, in transacting their joint concerns, may use a legal name, they must be excluded
from the courts of the union. . . . That name, indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but
the persons whom it represents may be the one or the other; and the controversy is, in
fact and in law, between those persons suing in their corporate character, by their
corporate name, for a corporate right, and the individual against whom the suit may be
instituted. Substantially and essentially, the parties in such a case, where the members
of the corporation are aliens, or citizens of a different state from the opposite party, come
within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution of the national
tribunals. 459

The Deveaux doctrine was overruled by the Supreme Court after
Marshall’s death, and, in explaining its change of course, the Court
noted that Marshall had long regretted his reasoning in Deveaux. 460 A
careful read of his opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College suggests
Marshall’s regret ran much deeper than the narrow confines of
Deveaux. To begin with, counter to his approach in Deveaux, Marshall
cited no British cases. In fact, he cited no American cases, not even his

457. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
458. Id. at 88.
459. Id. at 86–88.
460. See Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555–56
(1844):
We remark too, that the cases of Strawbridge and Curtiss and the Bank and Deveaux
have never been satisfactory to the bar, and that they were not, especially the last,
entirely satisfactory to the court that made them. They have been followed always most
reluctantly and with dissatisfaction. By no one was the correctness of them more
questioned than by the late chief justice who gave them. It is within the knowledge of
several of us, that he repeatedly expressed regret that those decisions had been made,
adding, whenever the subject was mentioned, that if the point of jurisdiction was an
original one, the conclusion would be different. We think we may safely assert, that a
majority of the members of this court have at all times partaken of the same regret, and
that whenever a case has occurred on the circuit, involving the application of the case
of the Bank and Deveaux, it was yielded to, because the decision had been made, and
not because it was thought to be right.
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own decision in Fletcher v. Peck, which the other four Justices in the
majority had expressly found to be controlling precedent. 461
The two sentences, below, are the most quoted passage from
Marshall’s opinion and are where I began the journey that has become
this Article:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its
very existence. 462

But what immediately follows those two sentences is critical to
an understanding of Marshall’s opinion:
These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed,
individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered
as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its
own affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and
endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand
to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these
qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means,
a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the
particular object, like one immortal being. 463

When one reads the entirety of this passage, and not just the first two
sentences, one is struck by how well Marshall understood the attributes
of corporate form.
And for Marshall, these corporate attributes were essential to
the evolution of the institution known as Dartmouth College:
The founders of the college, at least, those whose contributions were in money, have
parted with the property bestowed upon it, and their representatives have no interest in
that property. The donors of land are equally without interest, so long as the corporation
shall exist. Could they be found, they are unaffected by any alteration in its constitution,
and probably regardless of its form, or even of its existence. The students are fluctuating,
and no individual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution, which can be
asserted in a court of justice. Neither the founders of the college, nor the youth for whose
benefit it was founded, complain of the alteration made in its charter, or think themselves
injured by it. The trustees alone complain, and the trustees have no beneficial interest to
be protected. 464

Applying to Trustees of Dartmouth College the analysis used in
Deveaux would reduce the corporation to the natural persons who for
461. The only two citations Marshall made in his opinion were to a legal dictionary, and he did
so without providing the reader with any understanding of what the dictionary entries said, or
were based on. For the two citations, see Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S (4 Wheat.)
518, 633–34 (1819).
462. Id. at 636.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 641.
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the time being occupied the office of trustees. While this might be
appropriate for ensuring that no property rights that individuals had
before incorporation would be lost by the act of incorporation, it would
ignore the interests of other persons who Marshall now saw were part
of Dartmouth College viewed as an institution. Marshall saw, as did
Smith, that Dartmouth College as an institution would never have
existed but for the entrepreneurial efforts of Eleazar Wheelock, and
that the institution that had evolved over time was a result of the
contractual bargain made by Wheelock and John Wentworth, acting as
agent of King George III:
Dr. Wheelock, acting for himself, and for those who, at his solicitation, had made
contributions to his school, applied for this charter, as the instrument which should enable
him, and them, to perpetuate their beneficent intention. It was granted. An artificial,
immortal being, was created by the crown, capable of receiving and distributing for ever,
according to the will of the donors, the donations which should be made to it. On this
being, the contributions which had been collected were immediately bestowed. These gifts
were made, not indeed to make a profit for the donors, or their posterity, but for
something, in their opinion, of inestimable value; for something which they deemed a full
equivalent for the money with which it was purchased. The consideration for which they
stipulated, is the perpetual application of the fund to its object, in the mode prescribed by
themselves. Their descendants may take no interest in the preservation of this
consideration. But in this respect their descendants are not their representatives; they
are represented by the corporation. The corporation is the assignee of their rights, stands
in their place, and distributes their bounty, as they would themselves have distributed it,
had they been immortal. 465

It was this contractual bargain, the result of Eleazar Wheelock’s
lengthy efforts to obtain a corporate charter so as to capitalize on the
value of the educational enterprise he had created, that the State of
New Hampshire had unconstitutionally violated. It was this
contractual bargain that had resulted in an institution—Dartmouth
College—that was entitled in its own right to constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION
What began for me as a quick look to discover Marshall’s vision
of corporate rights, and the meaning of the oft quoted two sentences in
his opinion, expanded into an extended journey. Not only did Marshall’s
views turn out to be complex and capable of several interpretations, but
so did the views of other key participants. Moreover, the scope of my
understanding of the Dartmouth College controversy kept growing with

465. Id. at 642.
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each discovery, and I came to see how the case, broadly viewed, fit into,
and was part of, the creation of modern America. 466
But as to Marshall’s views, I kept coming back to Daniel
Webster’s famous closing peroration to his argument at Washington,
not recorded in the official report of the case, where after pausing, and
with voice trembling, he looked to the Chief Justice and said:
“This, sir, is my case. It is the case, not merely of that humble institution, it is the case of
every college in our land. It is more. It is the case of every eleemosynary institution
throughout our country, of all those great charities founded by the piety of our ancestors
to alleviate human misery, and scatter blessings along the pathway of human life. It is
more. It is, in some sense, the case of every man who has property of which he may be
stripped,—for the question is simply this: Shall our state legislature be allowed to take
that which is not their own, to turn it from its original use, and apply it to such ends or
purposes as they, in their discretion, shall see fit? Sir, you may destroy this little
institution: it is weak; it is in your hands! I know it is one of the lesser lights in the literary
horizon of our country. You may put it out: but if you do, you must carry through your
work! You must extinguish, one after another all those great lights of science, which, for
more than a century, have thrown their radiance over the land! It is, sir, as I have said, a
small college, and yet there are those that love it. . . . ” 467

Webster’s words must have been in the back of Marshall’s mind
as he analyzed the intended reach of the Contract Clause:
Almost all eleemosynary corporations, those which are created for the promotion of
religion, of charity or of education, are of the same character. The law of this case is the
law of all. . . . Are they of so little estimation in the United States, that contracts for their
benefit must be excluded from the protection of words, which in their natural import
include them? Or do such contracts so necessarily require new modelling by the authority
of the legislature, that the ordinary rules of construction must be disregarded, in order to
leave them exposed to legislative alteration?
All feel, that these objects are not deemed unimportant in the United States. The interest
which this case has excited, proves that they are not. 468

Marshall’s opinion in the Dartmouth College case reflects a
different view of the corporation than his opinion in Deveaux. Rather
than solely an abstract legal concept and useful tool for carrying on
charitable purposes or a business for profit, Marshall now
acknowledged the legal rights of corporations viewed as social
institutions with stakeholders and constituents whose interests could
not wholly be captured through a standard contractual or alter ego
analysis. Further, Marshall held that a constitutional right available to
natural persons should presumptively be available to prevent a state
from impairing a corporation’s charter rights.
466. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 6, and accompanying text (explaining that the
Dartmouth College controversy occurred at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, a time of
significant transformation and tension in modes of thought in the United States).
467. 2 LORD, supra note 141, at 148.
468. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 645–46.
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It is not enough to say, that this particular case [— the corporate charter as a contract— ]
was not in the mind of the convention, when the article was framed, nor of the American
people, when it was adopted. It is necessary to go further, and to say that, had this
particular case been suggested, the language would have been so varied, as to exclude it,
or it would have been made a special exception. The case being within the words of the
rule, must be within its operation likewise, unless there be something in the literal
construction, so obviously absurd or mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the
instrument, as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an exception. 469

Rather than the oft-quoted two sentences in his opinion, it is Marshall’s
recognition of the corporation as a social institution and constitutional
person, and the provocative implication of his contract clause analysis—
holding that corporations should be presumed ab initio to have the same
rights as natural persons absent clear textual or other evidence to the
contrary—that is relevant to our ongoing debates about the respective
roles, rights, and responsibilities of natural persons, the three
branches of the federal government, state legislatures, and the
modern corporation.
Debates about the constitutional rights of corporations will
continue in the years ahead. In the narrow direct-governance ambit of
the Dartmouth College case, for instance, we are now seeing questions
as to whether a state may amend its corporation code and thereby
compel the corporations it has chartered to meet board-of-director
diversity requirements. 470 Is this a legitimate exercise of a state’s
reserved charter-amendment power, or an impermissible infringement
on property rights under the Contract Clause? Does it matter whether
the statutory mandates impair the efficiency of the corporation, or are
opposed by a majority of a corporation’s members or shareholders?
Now and in the future, important questions will go far afield
from the Contract Clause setting of the Dartmouth College case, as we
have recently seen in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Moreover, it
can be expected that future cases regarding corporate constitutional
rights will assert claims that would have seemed unthinkable, or even
unintelligible, to the founders, and even to many of us today. The legacy
of the Dartmouth College case is to see these coming debates as rooted
in the continuing struggle between liberty and power that has
characterized the American nation from its gestation to the present,
and to see the unique role of the Supreme Court in mediating these
debates and adapting the Constitution to the changing needs of the
American people. As such, the Dartmouth College case should not be
cited for Marshall’s views about the artificial nature of the corporation,
469. Id. at 644–45.
470. See, e.g., Cydney Posner, New Challenge to California Board Diversity Laws, COOLEY
PUBCO (July 19, 2021), https://cooleypubco.com/2021/07/19/new-challenge-california-boarddiversity-laws/ [https://perma.cc/UU97-LB36].
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but for what it tells us about the human rights which a corporation, as
a social institution, reflects and embodies, and which in proper cases
the Constitution protects.

